Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 10

4-2012

Refugee Women as Cultural Others: Constructing Social Group
and Nexus for FGM, Sex Trafficking, and Domestic Violence
Asylum Claims in the United States
Meghan Casey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Recommended Citation
Casey, Meghan (2012) "Refugee Women as Cultural Others: Constructing Social Group and Nexus for
FGM, Sex Trafficking, and Domestic Violence Asylum Claims in the United States," Seattle Journal for
Social Justice: Vol. 10: Iss. 2, Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol10/iss2/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

981

Refugee Women as Cultural Others:
Constructing Social Group and Nexus for FGM,
Sex Trafficking, and Domestic Violence Asylum
Claims in the United States
Meghan Casey
I. INTRODUCTION
The safari van jolted to a halt on the mud and ditch-covered road—if it may
be called even that—amidst an expanse of land and sky. Clouds hung low after
a morning of rain, and the sun timidly shined light upon the greenery
interspersed in the Maasai village largely composed of rounded mud huts. Men
vested in crimson-colored warrior garments greeted our group of Americans
with proud nods and kind words, while women and children lingered in the
small doorways of nearby huts and weakly constructed fence posts. Young girls
with infants strapped onto their small backs timidly approached, prowling
sheepishly behind nearby trees. After a demonstration of a traditional warriorjumping dance, our foreign group was led through the grass- and dirt-strewn
grounds, into low-ceilinged mud huts that, while only a few feet in length,
housed large families.
At one point, our tour guide, a young and muscular Maasai warrior,
stopped our group at the village center to explain a central cultural practice—
one, he explained, that was often misunderstood by Westerners such as
ourselves. Female circumcision, he told us matter-of-factly, was an important
practice and essential to Maasai culture because girls could not be inducted


I would like to especially thank Professor Won Kidane for his guidance in the creation
of this piece. I also deeply appreciate the support of the SJSJ editing staff and board, as
well as my many friends, family members, and colleagues who share in a passion for
global justice. Most importantly, I am grateful for the inspiration of refugee women, who
continue to inspire me with their perseverance, faith, and hope.
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into the fullness of their womanhood without it. He further explained, almost in
an attempt to justify the practice, that unlike men, who had to undergo
circumcision publicly without any showing of pain, women had an easier time
because the ceremony was conducted in secret. A woman could not be
accepted as a part of the community—nor could she marry—unless she had
been circumcised.
In the remote isolation of that African savanna, with little more than goats
and cows for sustenance, minute huts as abodes, and an ingrained tradition of
male-warrior protection—it was not so difficult to believe his words. How, I
mused, could a Maasai woman not submit to such a practice without risking
her own survival through community banishment? In that afternoon, I saw a
mere glimmer of the vulnerability that pervades the lives of Maasai women.
Social forces—ones that I could not even begin to articulate or comprehend—
had instilled in them a sense of subordination that seemed inescapable.1
And yet some women do escape—whether by willful choice or by force.
Today, women constitute the majority of refugees worldwide.2 In addition to
facing the challenges of war, poverty, and natural disasters that so often plague
developing countries, women encounter particularized persecution on the basis
of their gender.3 These violent, gender-based atrocities permeate every part of
the globe, ranging from honor killing in Middle Eastern countries to female

1

This anecdote details the author’s experience visiting a Maasai village in rural Kenya in
May 2007.
2
Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A
Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender
Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 286 (2002).
3
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 946 (5th ed. Foundation Press 2009) (“International law ignores the persecution
that girls and women endure, even die under, for stepping out of the closed circle of social
norms. . . . Women are also abandoned or persecuted for being rape victims, bearing
illegitimate children, or marrying men of different races. . . . There is no recognition that they
need legal protection and refugee status both as individuals in their own right and as
women.”) (emphasis in original).

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Refugee Women as Cultural Others

genital mutilation (FGM) predominantly in Africa to femicide4 in Central
America to the domestic violence that pervades every society. Beyond these
specific forms of persecution are culturally ingrained notions of female
subordination. Because women possess few resources and are allowed far less
financial or educational independence than the men in their societies, they
easily become entrapped in cycles of emotional and physical violence.
International recognition of the particular challenges faced by refugee
women has expanded over the past several decades. Since the United Nations
Convention on Refugees in 1951, many countries, including the United
Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and the United States, have adjusted
their policies to better address the needs of refugee women.5 The development
of asylum law over the past sixty years reflects these efforts, as countries have
taken steps to construct gender-specific guidelines for adjudicators as well as
legal formations that address gender-related challenges. Such changes have
provided legal language and redress for refugee women who would otherwise
struggle to communicate the subtle nuances of their particularized challenges.
While imperfect, these strategies help to ameliorate dormant but severe forms
of gender discrimination that saturate a male-dominated world. In light of the
1951 Convention’s lack of specificity in using gender-neutral language for the
definition of “refugee,” these international efforts are especially necessary in
4

Femicide, or the violent killing of women, is a growing phenomenon in Central America.
It is characterized by the following characteristics: savagery (mutilation, dismembering,
etc.), rape or sexual abuse, politically significant messages (e.g., messages left on the body
itself or nearby), identity destruction (such as damage to the face), massacres (killing both a
woman and her children), and ritualization of the crime scene. CENTRAL AMERICAN
WOMEN’S NETWORK (CAWN), FEMICIDE AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, CONTEXT AND REALITIES 2 (2009), available at
http://www.cawn.org/html/spring09%20version%20website.pdf [hereinafter CAWN
Femicide]. See generally HEINRICH BOLL STIFTUNG, UNION EUROPA, CENTRAL AMERICAN
WOMEN’S NETWORK, FEMINICIDIO: UN FENOMINO GLOBAL DE LIMA A MADRID
[FEMICIDE: A GLOBAL PHENOMENON FROM LIMA TO MADRID] (Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.cawn.org/assets/Feminicidio%20de%20Lima%20a%20Madrid.pdf.
5
See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: a
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 779–80 (2003)
[hereinafter Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus].
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order to secure equal protection for refugee women who were not present,
either practically or conceptually, for the original construction of these refugee
protections.6
Still, the United States has struggled to follow suit. In the extremely
convoluted realm of asylum law, which theoretically provides micro-level
solutions to macro-level global problems, American courts have tried
unsuccessfully to formulate legal theories that address the specific needs of
refugee women. Due largely to the arbitrariness that characterizes US
immigration law, there is no consistent, cognizable legal framework for
gender-based asylum claims. Instead, judges are left to force factors of gender
and cultural concern into the male-centered legal constructions of asylum law.
Thus, the lack of jurisprudential consensus for gender-based asylum claims has
resulted in widespread misapplication of basic human rights principles and
counterintuitive asylum denials of viable claims. To be granted asylum in the
United States, an applicant must show that she fits into one of five statutorily
defined categories, and that there is a connection, or “nexus,” between the
alleged persecution and one of these groups.7 Of primary concern in this article
is the “social group” category, from which most gender-based claims are
construed.
Specifically, it is problematic that US courts give undue weight to relativist
notions of the cultural Other8 in their construction of “social group” and
6

Although international human rights law has, from the outset, applied to men and women
equally, women have long experienced gross inequalities in the enjoyment of fundamental
rights. HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 248 (2d ed. 2009). Also, in the aftermath of World
War II, the primary focus of the negotiating states was ending the atrocities committed
during the war. Protections that focus on civil and political harms (as opposed to those
encompassing private, domestic affairs) have traditionally been the focus of refugee
protection and human rights in general. Martina Pomeroy, Left out in the Cold: Trafficking
Victims, Gender, and Misinterpretation of the Refugee Convention’s “Nexus” Requirement,
16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 453, 470–71 (2010).
7
See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
8
The philosophical notion of women as Others was first developed by Simone de Beauvoir.
In her work The Second Sex, she bases the construct of the Other on Hegel’s account of a
master-slave relationship: “The situation of women is comparable to the condition of the
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“nexus” within the definition of a “refugee.” Their focus narrows in on the
intent of the persecutor and the division of public and private spheres, which
prevents an accurate understanding of the subtle forces that subordinate
refugee women. In addition, courts impute gender-related motives to other
grounds for asylum, such as political opinion or religion, thereby clouding any
real recognition of gender-based persecution. They fail to consider the unique
societal role of refugee women in their reluctance to consider common past
experience as an immutable characteristic for the purposes of constructing a
social group. Furthermore, courts ironically require a showing of social
visibility for groups that are in fact relegated to the invisible shadows of
society.
These interpretive failures indicate judicial and legal biases—whether
conscious or subconscious—that view refugee women as cultural Others who,
to some extent, should be the products of their own respective cultures. As
discussed below, some cultures are accepting of practices that violate
internationally recognized women’s rights. Yet, in a multicultural American
society defined by the acceptance and preservation of individual identity,
people can often justify abhorrent acts or practices out of respect for cultural
difference.9 Thus, deep-rooted notions of American individualism make it
likely that application of asylum law—while entrenched in notions of
Hegelian Other in that men . . . identify themselves as the Subject, the absolute human type,
and measuring women by this standard, identify women as inferior.” Debra Bergoffen,
Simone de Beauvoir, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.
2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauvoir/#SecSexWomOth. This article
uses the concept of the Other as a vehicle not only to explore gender oppression, but also to
analyze the influence of culture on gender socialization. In its exploration of cross-cultural
gender issues in the context of international human rights, it elucidates Beauvoir’s
proposition that, globally, women “lack the solidarity and resources of the Hegelian Other
for organizing themselves into a ‘we’ that demands recognition.” Id.
9
See Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women
in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1311, 1317
(1991) (discussing cases where sentences were mitigated for domestic abuse and rape in
criminal prosecution of Pacific Asian men based on rationales of cultural relativism) (“The
urge to protect culture can function as a sanction for violence. . . . American culture . . .
perceives the individual as separate from the physical world and others.”).
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international human rights—would also try to respect the nuances of cultural
differences. However, this article proposes that US asylum jurisprudence
should strive to eradicate such biases because they contravene fundamental
concepts of human rights. The construction of social group and nexus for
female asylum-seekers should be formulated in a way that (1) recognizes
common past experience as an immutable characteristic, (2) does not
misconstrue gender issues under other grounds for asylum relief, (3) does not
barricade the private sphere from state protection, and (4) places less emphasis
on the subjective intent of the persecutor. This formulation, by refusing to
portray refugee women as cultural Others, would apply to situations of
persecution across the globe because it recognizes inherent, transcultural
concepts of human dignity. Ultimately, this less rigid jurisprudential solution
would lead to more consistent, just outcomes in evaluations of refugee status.
This article will analyze three specific types of gender-based asylum claims
to demonstrate global application of this proposed construction: (1) female
genital mutilation (which takes place primarily in various countries in Africa);
(2) sex trafficking (which takes place worldwide, but primarily in Eastern
Europe and Asia); and (3) domestic violence (a global phenomenon, though in
light of recent developments in US jurisprudence, the focus here will be
Central America). This analysis will first provide a global overview of refugee
women, including background on these three specific types of persecution, as
well as an explanation of various international actors’ constructions of genderbased asylum claims. Next, a description of current US asylum jurisprudence
will explain how victims of the three types of persecution are typically treated
in American immigration law. Finally, a jurisprudential construction will be
proposed, tackling the specific categories of social group and nexus devoid of
notions of cultural Otherness.
The personal narratives that preface each subsection of this article stem from
my experiences traveling in Kenya and Nicaragua during the summers of 2007
and 2010. They also include my perspective garnered from working in an
immigration legal clinic for a nonprofit agency in Boston, Massachusetts, and
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an agency advocating for unrepresented immigrant detainees at the Northwest
Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington. These reflections are especially
informed by my work as a legal advocate for refugee women and domestic
violence survivors from Africa, Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Middle
Eastern countries. The narratives are also bolstered by my studies of gender
disparities in Africa and Latin America, international human rights, and
volunteer work with immigrant communities in the United States and Italy.
To begin, the terminology used in this article must be discussed. First of all,
I use the phrase “gender-based asylum claims” to refer solely to claims of
persecution related to a refugee’s identity as a woman and the forms of
violence derived from that identity. However, this language choice was made
merely for the purpose of narrowing the scope of this topic. Gender identity
encompasses much more than basic distinctions between the masculine and
feminine. The severe forms of persecution faced by the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) community throughout the world should not be
overlooked, and that population likewise encounters many of the same
challenges in US asylum law as refugee women. Within the limits of this
article, however, their plight cannot be adequately addressed.10
In addition, this article assumes a non-relativist position and therefore
chooses to use the term “Female Genital Mutilation,” or FGM, in lieu of the
term, “Female Genital Cutting,” or FGC.11 Proceeding from the assumption
that there are fundamentally shared human rights that transcend borders and
10

For further information on gender-based claims by the LGBT community, see generally
Michael A. Scaperlanda, Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and Immigration
Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 475, 501–12 (2002) (arguing against asylum in cases where
claimed persecution is based on conduct rather than status); William Branigan, Gays’ Cases
Help to Expand Immigrants’ Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at A1; Matter of TobosoAlfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990); Cornejo v. Ashcroft, 116 Fed. Appx. 900, 903 (9th
Cir. 2004) (unpublished memorandum) (acknowledging “overt discrimination against gays”
in Peru but affirming BIA denial of asylum); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F. 3d 1163 (9th Cir.
2005) (recognizing asylum claim for a Lebanese gay man).
11
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 971 (“Those who see FGM as a cultural norm
that the United States should tolerate object to the word ‘mutilation,’ preferring to call it
female genital ‘surgery’ or ‘cutting.’”).
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cultures, use of the word “mutilation” conveys the message that this practice is
an act that should be condemned, while the word “cutting” is a more objective
description of what the ritual in fact entails. Even despite its cultural
importance, the international community considers FGM to be a human rights
violation, and the United States has outlawed the practice.12
Next, the term “alien,” though widely used as a term of art in the realm of
immigration law, has a facially negative connotation. It implies an inherent
“otherness” in the person to whom it refers and it presumes that such a
person—though perhaps foreign-born—does not belong in the United States.13
This article thus avoids use of this term, and instead chooses the less
condemning term, “noncitizen,” to refer to individuals who have uncertain
legal status in the United States.

II. A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF REFUGEE WOMEN
A Congolese Woman, a Weapon of War14
After fleeing the Democratic Republic of the Congo in fear for her life,
Mariam arrived in Boston merely weeks before our first meeting in early
12

The Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the United Nations Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women recognize that practices harmful to women such as
[FGM] [sic] are violations of human rights. Lisa Frydman & Kim Thuy Seelinger, Kasinga’s
Protection Undermined? Recent Developments in Female Genital Cutting Jurisprudence, in
13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1074 (Sept. 1, 2008). Also, in IIRIRA § 645, Congress made
FGM a federal criminal offense, punishable by up to five years in prison. Legomsky, supra
note 3, at 973.
13
See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1. (“[T]he word “alien,” even when not
adorned with the modifier “illegal,” has always struck a disturbing chord. Many feel that the
term connotes dehumanizing qualities of either strangeness or inferiority (space aliens come
readily to mind) and that its use builds walls, strips human beings of their essential dignity,
and needlessly reinforces an ‘outsider’ status.”).
14
For more information on the horrific incidents of mass rape in the Congo, see Laura
Smith-Spark, How did rape become a weapon of war? BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2004, 4:39 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4078677.stm. See generally REBECCA FEELY, CTR. FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING CONFLICT AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO (Mar. 2008), available at
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CongoSerious.pdf.
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September 2008. Her story was not unlike others that passed through the
confines of our office, and yet in a most real way, she represented for me the
epitome of suffering experienced by all refugee women.
Speaking rather awkwardly through an interpreter, Mariam spun out her
story in bits and pieces as I coaxed her with questions. Her husband had been
targeted by Congolese forces as a result of his Rwandese nationality—having
received threats and beatings, he was eventually detained and killed.
Throughout the course of his persecution, Mariam was likewise targeted,
and—as is common in such war-torn countries today15—her persecution
manifested itself in a very gender-specific way. On several occasions, Mariam
was raped and beaten by the same men that eventually killed her husband.
Though she was able to narrowly escape her country with the assistance of a
friend, she left behind five children. Days after she arrived in the United
States, she gave birth to a baby girl, the result of one of the rapes that had
taken place. As Mariam spoke, she asked at one point if she could breast-feed
her baby. With this child in her arms, she tried to recall the last time that she
had heard of her other children’s whereabouts. That image—of Mariam
nurturing her US citizen child as she told me the gruesome details of her
persecution—dramatized the particular burdens that refugee women carry
with them across the globe.
Eighty percent of refugees and displaced persons worldwide are women and
children.16 Although all refugees—regardless of gender—are driven from their
home countries by war, political strife, and natural disaster, women encounter
particularized forms of persecution on the basis of their gender identities even
during times of peace and relative stability.17
In addition to the forms of persecution discussed in this article (FGM, sex
trafficking, and domestic violence), women are subjected to dowry deaths,
coerced or forced adherence to religious dress codes, and are the victims of
15
16
17

Smith-Spark, supra note 14.
Randall, supra note 2, at 286.
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 946.
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mass rape used as a weapon of war. Gender inequality is present in virtually all
societies: women are often excluded or underrepresented in state and social
institutions; they receive unequal pay and inadequate reproductive health care;
and they have less access to general health services, education, and other
resources. Often, women are left in the exclusive role of child caretaker and
domestic worker.18 The specific manifestations of persecution discussed below
are therefore part of a wider pattern of female discrimination.19
Given that the majority of refugee women come from developing nations
with oppressive societal norms for women, the reception of these refugees into
nations of the liberal democratic West can result in constructions of them as
cultural Others.20 The concept of Otherness is a human experience of
“difference, of not belonging, of the unknown,” and is particularly dramatized
for groups who have experienced forced exile, such as refugee women.21 In the
context of asylum law, these undertones of foreignness and strangeness are
further complicated by the “power relations inherent in the encounter between
the receiving country and its migrants.”22
Social and theoretical constructions of the Other inform relativist thinking.
For example, in their home countries, women can be viewed as “legitimate
victims,” who are seen as having little or no reason to complain about their

18

Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 285–86.
ANDREJ ZERNOVSKI, COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION, REFUGEES, AND
POPULATION, GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TO ASYLUM 8 (2010), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12350.pdf
[hereinafter
Council of Europe Report].
20
Randall, supra note 2, at 281.
21
Diana Wong, Asylum as a Relationship of Otherness: A Study of Asylum Holders in
Nuremberg, Germany, 4 J. REF. STUD. 150, 153 (1991). “[T]he biography of the political
refugee is marked by the trauma of persecution, the trauma of flight and–last but not least–
the trauma of arrival all of which are sources of additional emotional stress which have to be
given careful consideration.” Id. at 161. This also relates to Beauvoir’s theory of the Other
because, as she explores, they “cannot call on a bond of shared history to reestablish their
lost status . . . dispersed among the world of men, they identify themselves in terms of the
differences of their oppressors . . . rather than with each other.” Bergoffen, supra note 8.
22
Wong, supra note 21, at 152.
19
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victimization because they belong to an inferior social class.23 Yet, through the
reasoning of cultural relativism, there is no need to force the particularities of
one culture to conform to the values of another.24 Undertones of cultural
relativism within the asylum system would therefore permit justification of
such “legitimate victims” even though US societal norms would not.25
Rationalizing the idiosyncrasies of world cultures, however, allows for
limitless methods of subjugation and violence under an illusory guise of
cultural respect. Though they are often not recognized as such, the three forms
of persecution discussed in this article are mere symptoms of an underlying
disease of global female subordination often perpetuated by relativist thinking.
A. Three Types of Persecution
1. Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)
An estimated 130 million women worldwide have been affected by some
form of FGM, with over three million girls at risk of undergoing the practice
every year.26 Performed predominantly in numerous African tribes, FGM has
special cultural significance because it signifies a girl’s transition into
adulthood. Usually, the procedure is performed by female members of a tribe
upon girls of a young age—and especially before marriage.27 There is immense
23

Rimonte, supra note 9, at 1315.
Id. at 1321 (“[T]hose who advocate use of the cultural defense . . . are respectful of the
idiosyncratic cultures of ethnic minorities, and, by accepting cultural explanations of an
individual’s behavior, they affirm the validity and dignity of all cultures. This is cultural
relativism at its best, sending a message that cultures are equal to one another, and cannot,
and should not, be comparatively valued.”).
25
See id.
26
Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 8. See also Mary Nyangweso Wagila, Beyond
Facts to Reality: Confronting the Situation of Women in “Female Circumcising”
Communities, in J. HUM. RTS. 6, 393, 400 (2007) (“Reports indicate that out of every one
thousand females who undergo female circumcision, seventy women die as a result.”).
27
Wagila, supra note 26, at 406 (“No woman is allowed to get married without being
circumcised. Uncircumcised girls are warned about the possibility of ostracization [sic] and
rebuke by the whole family. They are threatened that they will not get husbands. If married,
they are threatened with the possibilities of misfortunes such as barrenness, still births,
deaths of husbands, and even their own death.”).
24
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social pressure to have the procedure performed, as the procedure often centers
around traditions of elaborate ceremonies as well as the cultural emphasis on
fertility and the production of children.28 Although the practice is integral to
many social and cultural systems of indigenous communities, it is also directly
associated with oppressive societal norms such as early marriage and limited
educational opportunities.29 The actual physical procedure of FGM is
extremely invasive, poses substantial health risks, and results in deprivation of
sexual pleasure as a means of female subordination. It can range from “partial
removal of the clitoris and/or prepuce (Type I, clitoridectomy) or clitoris and
inner or outer labia (Type II, excision), to partial closure of the vaginal opening
created by cutting and healing of the labia (Type III, infibulation), to other
vaginal pricking, scraping, or cauterization (Type IV).”30 Often, FGM is
performed under unsanitary ritual conditions with broken glass or unclean
blades.31 The short-term consequences of FGM include severe pain and
bleeding, infection (septicemia, tetanus, HIV, etc.), immobility, and urinary
retention.32 Long-term physical consequences include “formation of abscesses,
keloid scarring, infertility, accumulation of menstrual fluid, and serious
complications during pregnancy and childbirth, such as postpartum
hemorrhage, stillbirth, and low birth weight.”33 Psychological impacts of FGM
can “include eating and sleeping disorders, recurring nightmares, panic attacks,
difficulty concentrating and learning, and permanent loss of erotic and sexual
sensation.”34 Often, such health risks arise from the fact that FGM is usually
performed under unhygienic conditions with limited or no access to sufficient
medical care.35
28

Id.
Id. at 399.
30
Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1074.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Wagila, supra note 26, at 400 (“Most often, unsterilized instruments are used, including
knives, razorblades, scissors, thorns, and pieces of glass. Because circumcision takes place in
29
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Although rates of FGM have decreased in some areas as a result of
international efforts over the past decades to eliminate it, many countries are
still unable or unwilling to provide the necessary protections.36 The inability of
governments to eradicate the practice can be attributed to their lack of
commitment and failure to construct sensitive, practical strategies.37 Despite
international efforts to condemn the practice, often countries do not—or
cannot—respond sufficiently to such external pressure.38
2. Sex Trafficking
Trafficking in persons has been referred to as modern-day slavery.39 Under
the Palermo Protocol adopted by the United Nations in 2000, this term is
defined as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or deception or the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.40
a group setting, these instruments are used on more than one person, increasing the risk of
infection.”).
36
Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 8.
37
Wagila, supra note 26, at 406.
38
In the case of Kenya, for example, laws enacted to criminalize the practice were solely the
products of external pressure but did not reflect the intent of local communities to eradicate
the practice. FGM has been recognized as a violation of the rights of women and children,
including bodily integrity, self-determination, freedom of choice, and sexual fulfillment. It is
also considered a form of torture and violation of the 1984 United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CATCID). Id. at 402.
39
CLARE M. RIBANDO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBBEAN 1 (2007).
40
Stephen Knight, Asylum from Trafficking: A Failure of Protection, in IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS
2 (July 2007), available at
http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/knight_immigration_tra_0708.pdf. See also Pomeroy,
supra note 6, at 454 (quoting Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 3(a), G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th
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The severe exploitation that characterizes sex trafficking can include
abduction, incarceration, rape, sexual enslavement, enforced prostitution,
forced labor, physical beatings, starvation, and the deprivation of medical
treatment.41 Many trafficking victims originate from South and Southeast Asia
or the former Soviet Union, but human trafficking is also a growing problem in
Latin America and the Caribbean.42 In fact, it is one of the most lucrative and
fast-growing types of organized crime.43 According to US State Department
estimates, between 600,000 and 800,000 people are trafficked across
international borders for forced labor or domestic servitude on a yearly basis,
including 17,500 that are trafficked annually into the United States.44 About 80
percent of those trafficking victims are women and girls, frequently between
the ages of eighteen and thirty; at times, these women and girls become
trafficking victims with the consent of their husbands or other family
members.45
Risk factors such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, history of physical
or sexual abuse, homelessness, and drug use make women most susceptible to
exploitation.46 In addition, chauvinistic attitudes lead to practices that
discriminate against women, leaving them with limited economic opportunities
and making them prime targets as victims. Restrictive immigration policies in
destination countries create limited opportunity for legal migration and
contribute to an environment ripe for trafficking to occur.47 In fact, trafficking
is arguably a side effect of the recent trend in migration from the global

Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), entered into force Dec. 25,
2003, available at http://
www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%
20traff_eng.pdf.
41
Knight, supra note 40, at 1.
42
RIBANDO, supra note 39, at summary.
43
Id. at 3–4.
44
Id. at 4.
45
Id. at 6.
46
Id. at 8.
47
Id.
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“south” to the global “north,” which is generally motivated by the severe
inequalities and lack of basic human rights that plague most of the world’s
population.48 In light of the breadth and complexity of the global trafficking
problem, the international community agrees that this severe form of
persecution merits action.49
3. Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is defined as “purposeful behavior intended to control
and dominate an intimate female partner,” which serves a “historical, culturally
sanctioned purpose, which was and is for men to keep their wives ‘in their
place.’”50 Studies demonstrate that batterers use violence to meet needs for
power and control over others, and that batterers’ actions are often fueled by
stereotypical sex-role expectations for “their” women.51 Women thus become
targets of men, whose goal is to maintain power by subordinating women.52
48

Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 455–56. The global “south” can be generally defined as the
collection of developing nations generally located in the Southern Hemisphere and that are
generally dependent economically on the global “north.” The global “north” includes
economically developed and technologically advanced nations that are generally situated in
the Northern Hemisphere. See Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh, A Comparative Analysis of Global
North and Global South Economies, 12 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. AFR. 520 (2010), available at
http://www.jsdafrica.com/Jsda/V12No3_Summer2010_A/PDF/A%20Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20
Global%20North%20and%20Global%20South%20Economies%20(Odeh).pdf.
49
Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 457 (“In 2000, the United Nations introduced the Palermo
Protocol as an effort to address universally, for the first time, ‘all aspects of trafficking in
persons.’”). Also, the United States has established a T-visa program which allows the
Department of Homeland Security to grant status and other benefits so some victims of
severe forms of trafficking. However, though the US Department of Justice estimates that
approximately 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States each year,
the statute caps the number of T-visas that can be distributed annually at 5,000. Id. at 459,
460. The UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection for Victims of Trafficking also
reiterate that trafficking victims may meet the definition of a refugee. Id. at 463.
50
Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and the Violence Against Women in the “Domestic”
Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 400 (2001).
51
Anker, supra note 50.
52
Sharon Donovan, No Where to Run . . . No Where to Hide: Battered Women Seeking
Asylum in the United States Find Protection Hard to Come by: Matter of R-A, 11 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 301, 320 (2001).
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For the purpose of demonstrating the societal role and effects of domestic
violence, it is helpful to look at the specific example of Guatemala, a country
from which recent and significant US asylum cases have originated.53 In
Guatemala, society generally treats domestic violence as a private family
matter, so it is difficult for women to seek the protection of local governments
even if they are aware of that possibility.54 Although Guatemala passed a law
in 1996 on intra-familial violence that required public agencies and actors to
receive domestic violence complaints, very few women have brought claims
for protection under its provisions.55 Spousal abuse is a particular problem
within strongly patriarchal cultures, one which is exacerbated when alcoholism
and sexual abuse are prevalent.56 Many women commit suicide when they can
no longer cope with the abuse—the “shortcut” to escape unbearable
situations.57 Even beyond battering in the home, women are frequently
murdered by their intimate partners—and ‘femicide’ has been termed an outof-control crime within Guatemala.58
The domestic violence that pervades every country across the globe
manifests itself similarly, and often to an especially severe degree, in
developing countries such as Guatemala. In fact, worldwide, one in three
women has been beaten, coerced into unwanted sexual relations, or abused—

53

See Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec.
906 (Att’y Gen. 2001); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F. 3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010).
54
Donovan, supra note 52, at 306–09.
55
Id. See also Allison M. Reimann, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women
Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1212–13 (2009) (“In
domestic violence cases, police often fail to respond to emergency requests for assistance. . .
. Even when complaints of sexual crimes are filed, justice officials often exercise their
discretion not to prosecute first-time offenders.”).
56
Donovan, supra note 52, at 306–09.
57
Id.
58
More than 3,000 women were murdered in Guatemala between 2001 and 2007. Murder
rates of women have increased much more quickly than that of men and are characterized by
particular brutality, including sexual abuse and genital mutilation. Reimann, supra note 55,
at 1208. “The mother of one murder victim has lamented, ‘People say, it’s only a woman
who died, as if they were flies.’” Id. at 1212. See also CAWN Femicide, supra note 4, at 3.
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often by a family member or acquaintance.59 Women in Afghanistan face
brutal beatings and rape from their husbands—and subsequent persecution if
they try to escape; those in Asia and the Middle East are killed in the name of
honor; migrant and refugee women in Eastern Europe are brutalized for not
conforming to the accepted social mores of their new communities; even
women in rich, industrialized countries are beaten to death by their partners.60
Like other forms of gender-directed violence, it is a discrete manifestation of a
social mentality towards female subordination that states are all too often
unable or unwilling to eradicate.

III. INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS ON GENDER-BASED ASYLUM
CLAIMS
Because this article proposes that uniformity in notions of international
human rights is essential to effectuate just US asylum jurisprudence, it is
helpful to consult international perspectives on the nuances of gender in
asylum law. Although articulation of such universal standards is by no means
easily reached in a world where competing ideologies reflect different political
and social priorities, international actors have nonetheless taken steps towards
achieving this end.61 The enactment of the United Nations’ Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was the first pivotal step, indicating a
historic consensus on the perception of a “common humanity.”62 Additionally,
following the Universal Declaration, many states have accepted legally binding
obligations through formal conventions that include concepts from the
Universal Declaration.63

59

HENKIN, supra note 6, at 249.
See generally AMNESTY INT’L, IT’S IN OUR HANDS: STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
(2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT77/001/2004/en/d711a5d1f7a7-11dd-8fd7-f57af21896e1/act770012004en.pdf.
61
LYNN H. MILLER, GLOBAL ORDER 189 (4th ed. 1998).
62
Id. at 190.
63
Id.
60

VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012

997

998

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The foundations of refugee law are premised upon these shared notions of
basic rights, guaranteed to all persons regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality,
or any other artificial social construction.64 The principle of non-refoulement—
the notion that no party shall return a person to a country where they will be
persecuted—is the central principal of refugee and human rights law.65 While
the claims of refugee women raise challenging and distinct issues, there is an
appropriate analysis that fits within these principles. As refugee law has
evolved over the past decade, gender has been a part of—and perhaps even the
key impetus of—that development.66
A. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
Other International Tribunals
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the key
international refugee instrument, uses gender-neutral terminology that has, in
part, contributed to the historical failure of protection for women refugees. The
Convention defines a refugee as any person with a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
group, or political opinion.”67 The absence of gender as a Convention ground
has created a historically masculine slant to the refugee definition that falls in
line with an already male-dominated world. Because the definition of
“refugee” arose during the Cold War, “persecution” came to be understood
from an overwhelmingly male paradigm—one of political dissidence thwarted
by beatings, torture, and imprisonment.68 Growing recognition of this historical

64

Id. at 209.
Knight, supra note 40, at 3.
66
Anker, supra note 50, at 391, 393.
67
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 780 (citing Protocol Relating
to Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 167
art. 1.A(2)).
68
Id. at 781 n.28.
65
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failure to protect women has instigated international action to remedy gender
disparities in asylum law.69
Receiving countries of female asylum-seekers have made attempts to
address the particular needs of such female asylum-seekers by issuing genderspecific guidelines and modifying jurisprudence to better incorporate gender
issues.70 The goal of these international initiatives is to include gendered
perspectives into substantive and procedural aspects of the refugee
determination process. Currently, five countries have guidelines for gender
claims: Canada (1993), the United States (1995),71 Australia (1996), the United
Kingdom (2000), and Sweden (2001).72 Since 1999, the tribunals of three
countries—the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia—have issued
decisions addressing social group and nexus with interpretations that are the
most favorable to the claims of refugee women.73 Additionally, in May 2002,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published
guidelines on both social group and gender claims.74 UNHCR also issued
guidelines in 2006 relating to treatment of trafficking victims that explicitly
recognized gender as an important factor in construing asylum claims for that
69

Id. at 779–80. In 1985, the Executive Committee of UNHCR issued EXCOM conclusion
No. 39, which first recognized that gender-based claims could fall under the “particular
social group” category of the Refugee Convention. Id. at 779 n.14. Also, in 1991, UNHCR
issued Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women. Karen Musalo, A Short History of
Gender Asylum in the United States, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 49 (2010), available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Ref%20Sur%20Quarterly%20Musalo_Short%20History%20
of%20Gender%20Asylum.pdf [hereinafter Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum].
70
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 780–81.
71
Although the Guidelines’ stated purpose was “to enhance the ability of US Asylum
Officers to more sensitively deal with substantive and procedural aspects of gender-related
claims,” the Guidelines are not binding on the BIA. See Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and
U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender-Related
Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1581 (2001). Furthermore, subsequent cases indicate
that the BIA has failed to implement the suggestions. Id. at 1582.
72
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 779–80.
73
Id. at 777.
74
Id. at 804. The Guidelines “unequivocally state that proper interpretation of the refugee
definition ‘covers gender-related claims.’” Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum, supra
note 69, at 51.
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group.75 By contrast, commentators have characterized the US position on
gender claims as lacking alignment with this evolving international
jurisprudence.76
B.The Council of Europe: A Parliamentary Assembly on Gender-Related
Claims for Asylum
In July 2010, the Council of Europe77 recognized the importance of
incorporating the nuances of gender-based violence into asylum determination
and procedure.78 Noting explicitly the vast differences in the persecution
experiences of men and women, the Council of Europe’s Committee on
Migration, Refugees, and Population issued a report that called upon its
member states to set up asylum systems in ways that reflect gender
sensitivity.79 As a preface to their report, which was based upon fact-finding
missions by the Committee’s special rapporteurs, Council members articulated
the specific aspects of gender-related claims that present challenges for legal
systems worldwide.80 The Council recognized that persecution experienced by

75

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: The Application
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked, HCR/GIP/06/07
(Apr. 7, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/443679fa4.html.
76
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 778.
77
HENKIN, supra note 6, at 334, 623. The Council of Europe was created in 1950 to
promote democracy and human rights in the non-Eastern Bloc states of Europe. The
European Convention has been renowned as the most advanced and effective human rights
treaty system ever created, having reviewed hundreds of thousands of individual
applications. Compliance with the Convention is supervised by the European Commission of
Human Rights. Id.
78
Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 1.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 6–7 (“The present report enters into the framework of a set of adopted and
forthcoming reports prepared by the committee with the objective of improving the quality
and consistency of the asylum system in Council of Europe member states . . . As part of the
preparation for the present report, the rapporteur conducted a fact-finding mission to Geneva
on 9 April 2010 [sic] where he met with representatives of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Office for the High
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women often differs from that experienced by men, but that asylum systems
still tend to evaluate such persecution from a male-centered perspective.81
According to NGOs and international organizations, states do not always
consider the added dimension of gender when processing asylum
applications.82
The Council also articulated similar reflections on the definition of “genderrelated persecution” as those expressed in this article83—specifically, genderrelated persecution means that a causal relationship exists between the
persecution and the victim’s identity as a woman. In recognizing this causal
link, however, it is important to construct that identity in societal and cultural
contexts that often impute additional dimensions to the notion of being a
woman. The social and cultural demands, which arise as a result of biological
femaleness, are therefore directly connected to female identity. Thus, genderrelated persecution is not necessarily the same as persecution on the basis of
biological sex.84 It does not solely refer to an individual being persecuted due
to biological identity as a female, but also because she fails or refuses to
comply with the “social requirements” of being a woman within a certain
society or culture.85
In addition, the Council’s report made an important distinction between the
relationship between gender and the form of persecution and the motivation for
persecution.86 For example, a female asylum-seeker may be persecuted in a
gender-specific manner for reasons unrelated to gender (rape as a result of her
membership in a political party); she may be persecuted in a non-genderspecific manner because of her gender (flogging for a refusal to wear a veil);

Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the World Organisation Against
Torture.”).
81
Id. at 2.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 8.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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and she may be persecuted in a gender-specific manner because of her gender
(FGM due to her biological identity as a woman).87 Awareness of this
distinction is likewise applicable to formulations of gender-based asylum
claims in the United States, and it should be considered in constructions of
social group and nexus.

IV. ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Sanctuary for a Malian Victim
The ice and snow of Boston winters were an abrupt awakening for Kara,
who arrived mid-December from her home country of Mali. The hustle and
bustle of city streets, combined with the strangeness of foreign clothing and
accents, contrasted sharply with the isolated, rural life she had known. As a
woman in the Bambara Tribe, she knew the very distinct social role of being
homemaker, obedient daughter, and future wife. Her world was one of stark
divisions between male and female, power and subordination. Having
undergone the practice of FGM as a child, she was ushered into an arranged
marriage in her early adulthood as the third wife of a powerful local man.
Yet, Kara resisted these culturally restrictive pressures and attempted to flee
the confines of her forced marriage by escaping to Mali’s capital city,
Bamako. After she had been tracked down by her husband and beaten for
leaving, Kara decided to leave the country. In a fortuitous series of events, and
after several months of hiding in Bamako, Kara managed to board a plane to
the United States. During her time in Boston, she kept in communication with
her younger sister, whom she had mothered and cared for since she was an
infant. Kara was constantly in fear that her sister would be subjected to the
same fate—having not yet undergone FGM, Kara’s sister faced this procedure
as well as an arranged marriage with one of her cousins.
By the time Kara met with me to tell her story, eight years had passed since
Kara had first entered the United States. Uneducated, unable to speak English,
87

Id.

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Refugee Women as Cultural Others

and wary of primarily male authorities, Kara never thought to seek help. I was
faced with the difficult task of explaining to her that her chances of finding
asylum in the United States were slim to none. Numerous obstacles—the oneyear statutory bar88 among others—would prevent her from making her case
as a victim of persecution.
B. Current US Asylum Law: An Overview
Building a successful asylum case in the United States involves a complex
series of substantive and procedural hurdles. Within the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), a refugee is defined as a person with a “well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, or political opinion.”89 This definition requires
“proof of (1) an objectively reasonable fear of harm which is serious enough to
be considered ‘persecution,’ (2) which is causally linked or bears a ‘nexus’ to
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.”90 The Attorney General may, at his or her discretion, grant asylum to
a noncitizen who qualifies as a refugee within the meaning of the INA.91 But
overall, the applicant bears the burden of proving his or her refugee status.92
88

“As a result of IIRIRA § 604(a), asylum (but not withholding of removal) requires ‘clear
and convincing evidence’ that the application is being filed within one year of the applicant’s
arrival in the United States.” LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1045. Legal
professionals have significantly contested this requirement as the immediate priorities of
refugees upon reaching the United States usually include locating friends, family members,
food, and lodging. Furthermore, many refugees do not speak English and are not able to
locate a lawyer to help them with the labor-intensive process of filing an asylum claim
within this limited time frame. Id. at 1045.
89
Id. at 892.
90
Id. at 781.
91
Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010).
92
Id. The United States provides three possible remedies to refugees in accordance with the
1951 Convention: withholding of removal, asylum, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT). LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 893, 1095. Because the
application process for the former two remedies is exactly the same, this article will address
only the requirements for asylum. A primary difference between asylum and withholding is
that the latter is not subject to the one-year bar. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at
1045.
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Procedurally, an asylum application is first reviewed by an Immigration
Judge (IJ) during an interview with the applicant.93 The IJ questions the
applicant about the intricacies of her claim, and determines the applicant’s
credibility—arguably the most important factor for the success of a claim.94
Fair and accurate determinations of credibility are often complicated by
psychological symptoms of trauma and/or differing cultural perceptions of
asylum-seekers.95 Indeed, failure to consider cultural or psychological factors
in credibility determinations has led to skewed results.96 If an appeal is filed,
an applicant’s case is reviewed by a panel of three judges on the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA).97 A decision by the BIA can be appealed all the
way to the United States Supreme Court.98
Although in March 1995 the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)
issued “Gender Considerations”99 in an effort to recognize the unique
circumstances of female asylum-seekers, these guidelines are not binding on

93

LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 894.
See id. at 1005. In all applications for asylum, the Court must make a threshold
determination of a respondent’s credibility. See Matter of O-D, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079, 1081
(BIA 1998).
95
Stuart L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum Applicants: Don’t Be
Fooled, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 725, 729 (2008) (“Ironically, the dissociation
caused by the trauma can adversely affect asylum applicants’ credibility as they attempt,
with difficulty, to describe the trauma. Immigration Judges and Asylum Officers are
understandably suspicious of factual accounts with conflicting, inaccurate, or missing data,
but need to take into account the possibility that the very experience itself of severe trauma
could be interfering with its description in an affidavit, an interview, or a courtroom.”).
96
See id. Examples include “the case of the Guatemalan domestic violence victim whose
PTSD was not recognized as a valid diagnosis because she was able to pay her bills on time,
nor was the case of the Kenyan woman whose PTSD supposedly could not have contributed
to her delay in filing for asylum because she was still able to attend church. Both cases
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of what PTSD is and is not. Traumatized
people often avoid people, places, and activities that are unwelcome reminders of the original
traumatic event or events.” Id. at 731.
97
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 894.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 957 (“The INS Gender Guidelines review various relevant international human
rights instruments. . . . The main goal was to emphasize to asylum adjudicators that genderrelated asylum claims are to be taken seriously.”).
94
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the BIA and subsequent cases indicate that the BIA has failed to implement
these suggestions.100 The discretion afforded to IJs and asylum officers is not
to be underestimated. Statistical studies show vast and arbitrary disparities in
grants of asylum depending on the background, experience, and gender of
adjudicators.101 Such unnerving statistics make it all the more essential to have
reliable, concrete formulations of gender-based claims.
1. Social Group
Of the enumerated grounds for the definition of “refugee,” the classification
that is often interpreted to encompass gender-based claims is “a particular
social group.”102 Under In re Acosta, US case law has interpreted social group
to include “a group of persons, all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic.”103 This shared characteristic might be innate, such as sex, color,
or kinship ties; in some circumstances, it might be a shared past experience,
including former association.104 Particular group characteristics that qualify
under this construction are determined on a case-by-case basis.105 Whatever the
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the “members
of the group cannot change, or should not be required to change, because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”106 This shared

100

Karen Musalo & Steven Knight, Gender-Based Asylum: An Analysis of Recent Trends,
77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533, 1542-43 [hereinafter Gender-Based Asylum]. See also
Sinha, supra note 71, at 1582 (referencing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA Jun. 13,
1996); In re R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (en banc), vacated (AG Jan. 19, 2001);
and In re S-A, Int. Dec. 3433 (BIA Jun. 27, 2000)).
101
See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372 (2007). See also LEGOMSKY
& RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1039 (“In many cases, the most important moment in an
asylum case is the instant in which a clerk randomly assigns an application to a particular
asylum officer or immigration judge.”).
102
See generally Randall, supra note 2, at 294.
103
Donovan, supra note 52, at 321 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA
1985)).
104
Id. at 321–22 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)).
105
Id. at 322 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)).
106
Id. at 322 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)).
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characteristic must make membership comparable to the other four grounds of
persecution.107 Additionally, courts have considered the factors of “social
visibility” and “particularity.”108
Although many circuits have adopted the Acosta test for social group, the
Ninth Circuit has defined social group slightly differently as, “a group of
people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common
impulse or interest.”109 Ninth Circuit courts at one point required that a
“voluntary associational relationship” exist among the group’s purported
members, imparting “some characteristic that is fundamental to their identity
as a member of that discrete social group.”110 Since the Circuit’s 2000 holding
in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, however, the test has evolved to permit an
applicant to demonstrate group membership either by a showing of voluntary
association or “an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities
or consciences of its members that members cannot or should not be required
to change it.”111
2. Nexus
Intricately related to the problems regarding courts’ constructions of social
group is that of nexus—or the causal relationship between the asylum ground
and the persecution. Asylum law’s nexus analysis involves a two-step process:
first, a relevant category must be identified; second, a causal connection must
be established between that ground and the applicant’s persecution.112 Yet,
nexus cannot be entirely analyzed independently of the particular ground for
persecution because the initial step requires an examination of against whom
the harm is directed before the persecutor’s motivation for the harm is

107

Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 784.
See, e.g., Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Matter of S-E-G,
24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Santos-Lemus v. Mukaskey, 542 F. 3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008).
109
Donovan, supra note 52, at 323 (citing Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
110
Id. at 323.
111
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
112
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 783.
108
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examined.113 Nexus requires a showing of some relationship between the
feared harm and the Convention ground (for the purposes of this analysis,
social group), and one of the most demanding tests has been adopted by the
United States.114 This test requires proof that the persecutor was motivated by a
Convention ground, meaning that the applicant must show the persecutor’s
state of mind.115 The REAL ID Act § 101(a)(3) requires that one of the five
protected grounds “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting
the applicant.”116 Other nations have not explicitly defined its meaning or
concede that meaning may differ based upon the context of a particular
claim.117
C. Formulation of Select Gender-Based Claims
1. FGM-Based Claims
US courts have a scattered history of jurisprudence for FGM-related asylum
claims. Although courts generally recognize FGM as persecution, the lack of
theoretical clarity in recent precedential decisions has lead to inconsistency and
confusion in constructing such claims.118 Where a personal history shows
113

Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s Particular Social
Group, 49 LOY. L. REV. 287, 291 (2003).
114
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 786.
115
Sinha, supra note 71, at 1595 n.179 (citing Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.
2000) (“[S]o long as one of the motives for the feared persecutory conduct relates to a
protected ground, the petitioner is entitled to that status.”)); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that applicant “must produce evidence from which it is
reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or implied
protected ground”); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509–10 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[P]ersecutory
conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one motive is one of the statutorily
enumerated grounds, the requirements have been satisfied.”).
116
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 997 (citing INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(I); Matter of
J-B-N & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2007)).
117
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 786. See, e.g., id. at 787
(citing Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (U.K. House of
Lords) (1999) (adopting a but-for causation test for the nexus requirement)). See also
Council of Europe Report, supra note 19.
118
See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) (recognizing the FGM claim
based on membership in the social group, “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
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individualized risk or intent of a third party to force FGM upon an asylum
applicant, she should be able to establish “both a subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable fear of future [FGM].”119
In the landmark 1996 case Matter of Kasinga, a nearly unanimous panel of
BIA judges recognized that the gender-specific practice of FGM is a form of
persecution, and that gender can constitute a social group in combination with
other characteristics.120 However, although the Kasinga court arrived at a
desirable practical result, it did so using an extremely narrow legal
construction.121 Even though FGM is a gender-specific practice imposed on all
girls because they are female, the BIA did not find that this persecuted group
was comprised of the tribe’s female members.122 Instead, the court found that
Kasinga had a legitimate fear of future persecution because she was a member
of the particular social group, “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
who had not had [FGM], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the
practice.”123 Additionally, the BIA found that the practice of FGM was a
country-wide problem in Togo, yet the nation had done nothing to prevent its
forced infliction on women.124 The BIA further focused on the fact that the
applicant had escaped the practice, placing her within a far more restrictive

who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”); Hassan v.
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007); Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir.
2005); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d
Cir. 1999); Matter of A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (AG 2008) (reversing BIA finding that the
presumption of future persecution was rebutted because FGM could not be performed twice
on the same individual).
119
Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1075.
120
Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1543; LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3,
at 968 (“The former INS detained Kasinga for 16 months despite repeated requests for parole
pending the disposition of her case. Nine days after a front page New York Times article
triggered widespread criticism of the INS, the agency released Kasinga from detention.”).
121
See Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1542. See also Karen Musalo, In re
Kasinga: A Big Step forward for Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES
853 (Jul. 1, 1996).
122
Randall, supra note 2, at 295.
123
Id. (quoting Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996)).
124
Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1076.
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social group of women “having intact genitalia” who oppose the imposition of
FGM.125 Analyzing FGM in its social context, the BIA found that it is a form
of “sexual oppression” that is “based on a manipulation of women’s sexuality
in order to assure male dominance and exploitation.”126 Thus, because the tribe
targeted women who had not suffered FGM in order to subordinate them, the
BIA found Kasinga’s persecution was “on account of” her membership in a
“particular social group.”127
However, Kasinga has since been followed by such cases as Matter of A-T
and Mohammed v. Gonzales, both of which reflect opposing viewpoints as to
whether FGM can constitute an ongoing harm.128 In Matter of A-T, the BIA
faced the question of whether a woman who had already been subjected to
FGM could still qualify for asylum on that basis.129 Generally, women who
have already had FGM performed can assert a claim for asylum based on past
persecution (the infliction of FGM), which entitles them to a presumption of
having a well-founded fear of future persecution.130 However, in Matter of AT, the BIA found that FGM is generally a one-time harm and that women who
have already been cut ordinarily have no fear for cutting again.131 It “rejected
the notion that past FGM constitutes ongoing harm to a woman as well as the
presumption that well-founded fear remains unrebutted by the continuing
harms of the ritual.”132 Similarly, the BIA rejected Ms. A-T’s forced marriage
claims, saying that such an arrangement did not rise to the statutory level of
persecution, and instead required an independent showing of clear probability
of persecution, which she had failed to make.133 However, the Attorney
125

Randall, supra note 2, at 295.
Donovan, supra note 52, at 325.
127
Id.
128
See Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005); Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 617 (AG 2008).
129
Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1078.
130
Id. at 1075.
131
Id. at 1073.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1078.
126
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General reversed the BIA decision, finding that FGM can in fact be performed
more than once on the same individual.134 Also, despite the fact that some
cases continue to be granted, the A-T decision has been mistakenly applied to
women who have already been subjected to FGM.135
Despite this troubling trend, in the Ninth Circuit case Mohammed v.
Gonzales, the BIA recognized past FGM as a viable claim to asylum given the
nature of the past persecution and its ongoing effects.136 It concluded that
“genital mutilation, like forced sterilization, is a ‘permanent and continuing’
act of persecution, which cannot constitute a change in circumstances
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear.”137 The BIA found
that Ms. Mohammed was targeted for persecution on account of two possible
social groups: “Somali females” or “young girls of the Benadiri clan.”138 These
three cases alone indicate the struggle of courts to construe claims of this
particularized gender-based violence, at the heart of which are
misconstructions of social group and nexus.
2. Sex Trafficking-Based Claims
Women seeking asylum based on a fear of sex trafficking in their home
countries are frequently denied sanctuary.139 While there has yet to be any BIA
or Circuit decision of precedential weight relating to such claims,140 a review
of existing unpublished decisions indicates a fundamental resistance to
134

Matter of A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617, 621 (AG 2008). The Attorney General cited
Mohammed in its analysis and also found that the future harm need not take the same form;
A-T’s forced marriage claim merited consideration as long as that alleged persecution was
based on the same social group. Id. at 622.
135
Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1083.
136
Id. at 1083–84.
137
See Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785, 800 (9th Cir. 2005).
138
Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1076.
139
See Knight, supra note 40. In a study done by the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies
at University of California, Hastings, the frequency of grants was found to be 64 percent of
affirmative sex-trafficking asylum cases at the lowest level, 35 percent at the immigration
court level, and 25 percent at the BIA. See id. at 5.
140
See Knight, supra note 40, at 5. In many of the 93 cases studied by CGRS, there was no
agency decision to review or no written decision to review. See id.
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acknowledging that even the most severe levels of harm linked to trafficking
might provide the basis for asylum.141
Although the vast majority of trafficking victims are targeted because they
are females, courts neglect to recognize persecution on the basis of gender.142
Most frequently, IJs and the BIA treat trafficked women as victims of personal,
criminal problems, thus finding them ineligible for asylum for failure to
demonstrate a nexus between their forced prostitution and the five categories
of persecution.143 For example, seventeen-year-old Ann, who was sent to the
United States on a student exchange program after being kidnapped by a local
trafficker, beaten, and repeatedly raped, was denied asylum.144 She had heard
the local trafficker making plans over the phone to traffic her, but was
eventually able to escape.145 Although she was found to be a credible
applicant, she was nonetheless denied asylum because the IJ determined that
“no connection existed between her kidnap, rape, and threatened trafficking
and any of the asylum grounds.”146 Instead, the IJ referred to her persecutor as
a “spurned suitor,” and found that his actions “were personal and criminal
toward the respondent.”147 The IJ’s ruling ignored the overwhelming evidence
that Ann’s treatment by her persecutor was very similar to the way in which
young women are forced into trafficking.148 Specifically, “traffickers are
documented to have used offers of marriage to recruit women for the sex trade
and for forced labor,” just as Ann’s trafficker had repeatedly approached her
on the street with marriage proposals.149 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial in a
mere few sentences, noting, “the respondent has failed to carry her burden of
141

Id.
Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 454.
143
Knight, supra note 40, at 6.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. (“The Department of Justice’s ‘Introduction to Human Trafficking’ repeatedly makes
reference to the use of ‘sham’ and ‘false’ marriages.”).
149
Id.
142
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proof ….that she should be persecuted on a protected ground to include [sic]
her political opinion or membership in a particular social group.”150
Other cases similarly illustrate courts’ refusal to include victims of sex
trafficking as a cognizable social group, which precludes a finding of a nexus
between the gender-related group and persecution. Courts have held that
defining a group solely by the group’s persecution entails impermissible,
circular reasoning.151 For example, one case involved a Thai woman who was
smuggled into the United States and forced into prostitution in a number of
cities.152 Entrusted to deliver a few hundred dollars to her captors, she bought a
plane ticket and was able to escape, but her mother had since received threats
in Thailand regarding an outstanding debt related to her trafficking.153 The BIA
rejected her proposed social group of “sex slaves from foreign countries who
are brought to the [United States] under false pretenses and forced at the threat
of death and destruction to participate in sexual activities” by stating that the
persons who were in contact with her family, “seemed more interested in
having the debt repaid than in finding the respondent herself.”154
Similarly, in the case of Sophie, a young Russian woman who was held in
captivity and repeatedly gang-raped, the IJ denied asylum based on her
proposed social group that included women of her country, “forced into
prostitution by the mafia who escape from sexual bondage.”155 The fact that
the IJ granted Sophie relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)
150

Id. at 7. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s finding that Ann was also barred from asylum
based on the one-year filing deadline even though she arrived as an unaccompanied minor at
the age of sixteen and was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The IJ
further noted that she could have “easily . . . rectified” her feelings of shame and humiliation
“by going to an attorney.” Id.
151
Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 466. Instead, trafficking victims must construct a narrower
category based on a distinctive quality that unites them such as being single, attractive,
educated, or orphaned as a child. Still, these cases are not guaranteed to be successful. Id.
152
Knight, supra note 40, at 7 (citing CGRS Case # 3695).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 9. The IJ relied on the BIA’s recent decision of Matter of R-A in the construction of
social group.
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implies that the primary issues had been those of social group and nexus,
which are not required under CAT.156 Additionally, in the small number of
cases resulting in positive grants of asylum, courts are reluctant to recognize
social groups constructed in principal part by gender, and rather focus on
forced prostitution and international trafficking.157
3. Domestic Violence-Based Claims
Survivors of domestic violence who seek asylum repeatedly encounter
courts that refuse to recognize either a cognizable social group or a nexus
between the alleged ground of abuse and the persecution. Even when courts
have sparingly recognized the existence of a social group, they have not
acknowledged that the women were targeted on this basis, but rather often
have imputed other grounds for asylum in lieu of finding a gender-based
group.158
In Matter of R-A, one of the most recent and influential BIA decisions on
this issue, asylum was originally denied to Rodi Alvarado, a Guatemalan
woman fleeing an abusive domestic relationship, because she failed to show
that she was a member of a particular social group.159 Ms. Alvarado had been

156

Id.
Id. at 12–13 nn. 138, 142, 146 (citing Matter of Anon, A79-607-478 (Oakdale, LA,
Immigration Court, Dec. 20, 2005) at 4; Matter of S-A, A# redacted (Chicago, IL,
Immigration Court, Jun. 18, 2001); Matter of F-L, A# redacted (Anchorage, AK,
Immigration Court, Jul. 24, 1998)).
158
See Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (vacated for review of “social group”
analysis, and finding that there was no nexus based on an imputed political opinion claim
that the applicant was harmed due to her resistance to overcome male domination); LazoMajano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting asylum to applicant subjected to
beatings and rapes based on a cynically imputed political opinion); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d
1233 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying asylum to an Iranian woman because the governmentmandated practice of wearing a chador was not so abhorrent to her so as to constitute
persecution, but recognizing that women constitute a social group).
159
Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1533. On December 10, 2009, Rodi Alvarado
was finally granted asylum, ending her fourteen year-long legal battle. See Domestic
Violence Victim Granted Asylum in the US, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 2009, available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/photos%20157
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the victim of extreme spousal violence for over ten years.160 Her husband, a
former soldier, “broke windows and mirrors with her head, whipped her with
electrical cords, pistol-whipped her, raped and sodomized her, and kicked her
in the genitalia, causing severe bleeding.”161 Her efforts to seek protection
from the police were fruitless.162 Despite her requests for help, authorities
refused to be involved, and the judge who handled her complaints informed
her that he “would not interfere in domestic disputes.”163 The BIA found that
her proposed social group was not satisfactory because its members were not
“recognized and understood to be a societal faction.”164
Also, the BIA determined that “the husband/persecutor’s motivation was
unrelated to Ms. Alvarado’s membership in the designated social group.”165
The BIA found that “although her husband might have beaten her because of
his own views on men and women, the evidence did not show that he beat her
because of what she believed.”166 Furthermore, the BIA indicated that Ms.
Alvarado had to make an additional showing that people in Guatemala
perceived the existence of her particular group and that women were expected
by society to be abused.167 In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) filed a brief to then-Attorney General (AG) John Ashcroft arguing that
Ms. Alvarado should be granted asylum.168 Though the AG remanded the case

%20Domestic%20Violence%20Victim%20Granted%20Asylum%20In%20US%20_%20NP
R.pdf.
160
Domestic Violence Victim Granted Asylum in the US, supra note 159.
161
Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 802.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 803.
166
Donovan, supra note 52, at 317.
167
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975 (quoting Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec.
918, 919) (BIA 1999).
168
Lisa Frydman, Key US cases relating to women asylum seekers, Women’s Asylum News
(Asylum Aid, London, U.K.), Sept. 2009, at 1, 2, available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/LF,%20Key%20Cases%20Relating%20to%20Women,%20
Women’s%20Asylum%20News,%2009-2009.pdf.
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to the BIA in 2008 after vacating the decision,169 Matter of R-A has been cited
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorneys and IJs alike to
deny other gender-based claims of asylum for forced prostitution, gang rape,
and honor killing.170 In his order for remand, the AG imposed the additional
requirements that had developed in asylum jurisprudence: social visibility and
particularity.171 Moreover, despite the filing of its 2004 brief, DHS has
repeatedly opposed asylum grants based upon domestic violence. Still, under
the Obama administration in 2009, DHS filed another brief conceding that
women who have suffered domestic violence may be able to establish
eligibility for asylum.172
While the trend of US jurisprudence appears to weigh against them,
survivors of domestic violence may find hope in the Ninth Circuit’s 2010
decision, Perdomo v. Holder.173 Although asylum was denied by both the IJ
and BIA, the Ninth Circuit chose to remand to the immigration court the case
of another Guatemalan woman seeking asylum, Ms. Lesly Perdomo, in order
to determine (1) whether “Guatemalan women” could constitute a particular
social group and (2) whether the applicant had demonstrated a fear of

169

LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975 (“Attorney General Janet Reno vacated
the Board’s decision in R.A., and ordered the Board to reconsider the case in light of the then
pending asylum regulations . . . Attorney General John Ashcroft ‘recertified’ the case to
himself for a decision. . . . Finally, in 2008, Michael Mukasey became the third attorney
general to certify the case to himself. He too remanded the case to the BIA.”).
170
Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1535.
171
Frydman, supra note 168, at 3 (“The BIA has tried to justify these requirements by saying
that they are consistent with UNHCR guidelines on social group claims. However, UNHCR
has repeatedly stated that this is not correct.”).
172
Frydman, supra note 168, at 3 (referencing Brief of Dep’t of Homeland Security, Matter
of L-R- (BIA Apr. 2009) (redacted), available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf. In that case,
Ms. L.R. was tormented by her common law husband, who raped and battered her for nearly
two decades. Her attempts to seek protection from the police went unheeded. Her asylum
claim was denied by an IJ in 2007, and DHS initially filed a brief supporting the IJ’s position
in 2008. It changed course under the Obama administration in 2009. Musalo, A Short History
of Gender Asylum, supra note 70, at 60.
173
Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010).
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persecution.174 The social group prescribed by the applicant was “all women in
Guatemala.”175 Ms. Perdomo alleged that her fear was based on the high
incidence of murder of women in Guatemala as well as the nonresponsiveness
of the government in addressing such atrocities.176 The Ninth Circuit found
that the IJ and BIA had erred in finding that this description could not
constitute a social group.177 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that it
had previously recognized that women, or young girls, of a particular clan
could constitute a particular social group.178 It also referenced the INS (now
United States Citizenship and Naturalization Services, or USCIS) Guidelines,
as well as other international authorities that recognize that the “common
characteristic of sex” may constitute a particular social group “under certain
circumstances.”179 Furthermore, the court rejected the BIA’s finding that “all
women in Guatemala” is “overly broad and internally diverse,” and instead
concluded “size and breadth alone does not preclude a group from qualifying
as such a group.”180

174

Id. at 669.
Id. at 665.
176
Id. at 664.
177
Id. at 669.
178
Id. at 667 (citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005)).
179
Perdomo, 611 F.3d at n.5 (“One of our sister circuits has recognized gender as the basis
for a particular social group. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). We also note that
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have recognized gender as the basis for a
particular social group.”).
180
Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668. The court also noted that it has rejected groups as overly broad
only where “there is no unifying relationship or characteristic to narrow the diverse and
disconnected group.” (citing Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F. 3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Another recent IJ asylum grant to a Honduran woman in January 2011 indicates an
encouraging trend towards more widespread recognition of domestic violence-based claims.
See Matter of Anon, A# redacted (San Antonio, TX Immigration Court, Jan. 19, 2011) (on
file with author). In its decision, that court rightly considered social and cultural factors
without imputing notions of Otherness: “Respondent indicates that women in Honduras are
widely seen as less deserving of basic human rights than men, that domestic violence is
common and largely accepted by society, and that the Honduran government has made little
effort to rectify this problem.” Id. at 14.
175
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Thus, even a cursory glance at US asylum case law related to gender-based
claims indicates that courts are lacking in legal constructions to consistently
address the particular nature of the persecution suffered by refugee women
subjected to FGM, sex trafficking, and domestic violence.

V. PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF US ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Invisible of Nicaragua
The air was thick with humidity as our jeep pulled to an abrupt stop on the
ditch-ridden dirt road. Curious faces appeared from the darkened interiors of
nearby tin-roofed homes, and we smiled, greeting them in Spanish. The church
across the street stood proudly amidst other thinly constructed buildings on the
one street that composed almost the entirety of this Nicaraguan pueblo. A
meeting with a handful of local community members was to take place inside
the church. Our small delegation was a part of an initiative to establish
mediation centers in rural communities to provide campesinos181 with access
to the far-removed features of their justice system.
Inside the church, we set plastic cups, soda, and crackers for the people who
wandered in, taking their seats to begin the meeting. Eventually, a group of
about ten men and four women gathered, and the mediators began the meeting
with a series of icebreakers and introductions. Then, the mediators assigned to
community members the task of drawing a haphazard map—with markers and
construction paper—of their pueblo, identifying all “conflict zones.” Over the
course of the next two hours, the mediators lead a discussion of various
problems facing the community—pigs crossing onto neighbors’ property,
armed soldiers stationed arbitrarily inside the town, drunken debauchery
outside the local bars.

181

Country-people. See translation at Wordreference.com,
http://www.wordreference.com/es/en/translation.asp?spen=campesino (last visited Feb. 11,
2012).
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As the conversation appeared to be nearing a close, one of the mediators
asked the group, “And what about intra-familial violence?” The initial
response to this question was met with silence. “Is it a problem?” he persisted.
I noticed that the four women sitting at the edge of the congregation were
nodding while the men muttered to one another. Finally, one of the men spoke
up, “Well, you see—it is normal, it is just the way things are. It is not really the
business of another man, how he treats his wife.” There was a grumble of
approval amongst the other men.
Later, as I watched rolling, green mountains sweep by my window on our
ride out from the countryside, I asked one of the Nicaraguan mediators if the
response we heard with regards to domestic violence was one she saw in many
other communities. Heavily, she told me that, unfortunately, it was—and that
even when a woman wanted to try to resolve a domestic dispute through
mediation, it nearly always ended badly, with further beatings from her
husband at home. It is so ingrained in the culture, she explained. There were
efforts to build shelters in some of the less remote towns for women fleeing
domestic violence, but they were very few and did not have many resources. I
was struck by the helplessness of the whole situation—of women unable to save
themselves from lives of violence, of a government equally as helpless.
B. New Legal Theories for Gender-Based Claims
US asylum law does not recognize the complexity of social pressures that
create such situations. Instead, courts have constructed refugee women as
cultural Others in their evaluation of gender-based asylum claims, thereby
allowing for relativist rationalizations of global female persecution.182 This
182

Sinha, supra note 71, at 1578 (“It seems as though the successful asylum-seeker must cast
herself as a cultural Other, that is, someone fleeing from a more primitive culture.”) (quoting
SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE
IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 92 (1998)); Sinha, supra note 71, at 1580 (“By fighting
‘sexism with racism,’ colonialist feminism defined its mission as saving their Third World
Sisters from their uncivilized cultures” (quoting RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE
EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 113)).
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construct must be overcome so that new legal theories of social group and
nexus that better incorporate gender sensitivities can be accepted. A separate
Convention ground of “gender,” which incorporates gender sensitivities into
asylum law’s persecution requirement, is favorable because it allows for a
more comprehensive restructuring of judicial viewpoints on gender-based
claims.
To illustrate that this remedial theory can be applied to a variety of genderbased claims throughout the world, this section’s analysis will continue to
focus on the three types of persecution that have been previously discussed
(FGM, sex trafficking, and domestic violence), but it will include geographical
diversity in the analysis of such claims so as to emphasize the universality of
fundamental human rights.
First, courts should construe “social group” to include common past
experience, avoid imputing gender-related persecution to other asylum
grounds, and place less emphasis on social visibility. Second, courts should
formulate “nexus” using a modified bifurcated approach that better
incorporates the cultural meaning of the private sphere and places less
emphasis on the intent of the persecutor. In addition, these jurisprudential
modifications can only be realized if asylum procedure provides a safe and
practical environment for refugee women to fully develop gender-sensitive
claims. Last, this section will address the primary concern by skeptics of
gender-based claims—that to liberalize jurisprudential standards in this area
would “open the floodgates” to an excessive number of female asylum-seekers.
C. Gender as a Separate Ground
Some legal scholars have argued that the best solution to judicial
misconstructions of gender-based asylum claims would be to simply add the
category of “gender” to the existing five grounds for which a refugee might be
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persecuted.183 Yet, for several reasons this is an insufficient remedy. While
adding “gender” as a Convention ground may signal to asylum adjudicators
that this group merits special consideration, this addition does not remedy the
substantive confusion that continues to exist with gender-based claims.
Generally, the malleability of the “social group” category would better serve
gender-based claims because it allows a broader framework with which to
conceive gender persecution. Judges who might be reluctant to recognize
persecution based strictly on a separate “gender” ground may be more
persuaded by developed legal principles, though still gender-related. For
example, the court in Kasinga, which constructed a very narrow social group
for which Kasinga was persecuted, may not have been persuaded that she was
sought out for maltreatment for being a woman but rather on that very specific
basis.184 Gender combined with social group allows for that analysis, which
may be more persuasive to certain judges or adjudicators, whose discretion is
especially determinative in asylum claim outcomes.185
Similarly, solely providing a separate ground would not necessarily alleviate
judicial confusion surrounding the notion that “women being persecuted as
women” is not the same as “women being persecuted because they are
women.”186 In the context of civil war, for example, rape may be used as a
means of persecuting a woman on account of her membership in an opposing
political party or ethnic minority.187 By contrast, a public flogging may be used
183

See Randall, supra note 2, at 302 (citing Mattie Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific
Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 179 (1993)).
184
The court constructed Kasinga’s social group to be, “young women of the TchambaKunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the
practice.” Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA Jun. 13, 1996).
185
See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1039 (referencing Ramji-Nogales, supra
note 101) (“A massive, recently completed empirical study also confirms what practitioners
have long recognized as a serious problem—sharp disparities in the asylum approval rates
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Randall, supra note 2, at 303 (citing Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the
Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213, 259 (1995)).
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to punish a woman for refusing to conform to oppressive religious practices.188
If a judge were to construe the former scenario of rape as gender-directed
persecution, such a construction might limit the woman’s asylum claim if other
evidence in the record does not show that she was targeted due to her identity
as a woman. Such a scenario would demand an analysis based on political
opinion or race as opposed to gender. Yet, in the absence of substantive
constructions surrounding the terms “gender” and “social group,” judges
would still be left without the proper legal tools to formulate claims that
incorporate gender nuances. The potential expansiveness of the “social group”
category allows it to accommodate claims of women belonging to a number of
different social subsets.189 Thus, adding “gender” as a separate ground for
persecution does not easily solve problems within American asylum law. In
addition to that added ground, it is necessary to create better formulated
constructions of “social group” and “nexus” to more effectively address the
complex needs of refugee women.
D. Formulations of Social Group
1. Common Past Experience
Courts should consider refugee women who have had a common past
experience of persecution to be members of a particular social group. The
social and psychological implications of having undergone violence and
subordination are unifying factors central to their identities as women. The
identifying feature of having had the experience itself is paired with sexual
identity, a quality already recognized by courts as an immutable
characteristic.190
Instead of construing claims of FGM to include common past experience,
courts—such as that of Matter of A-T—downplay the significant violence of
188

Id.
Id. at 302.
190
Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F. 3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F. 3d 1233
(3d Cir. 1993)).
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the practice. They rationalize that because the practice had already been
performed, there is no fear of future persecution.191 This reasoning ignores the
societal role of FGM that was recognized in Matter of Kasinga, which
characterized the practice as a “form of sexual oppression” that is “based on
the manipulation of women’s sexuality in order to assure male dominance and
exploitation.”192 By evading this social function of the practice, courts equate
FGM to an act of violence such as the removal of a limb and refuse to
acknowledge that it is a mere symptom of a greater malignancy. To do so
places refugee victims of FGM in a culturally neutral sphere outside the
comprehension of male-reasoned legal theories.
Placing greater emphasis on—or at least recognizing the significance of—
the effect on a woman’s life from a past FGM experience would allow courts
to face the deeper, more widespread reality of female subordination. The court
in Mohammed v. Gonzales exemplifies the product of such reasoning. In that
case, the Ninth Circuit employed a variation of this emphasis on past
experience when it characterized FGM as a “permanent and continuing” act of
persecution.193 The court was able to reach this conclusion only by considering
the deep social and psychological implications of the practice, stating that “the
extremely painful, physically invasive, psychologically damaging, and
permanently disfiguring process of genital mutilation undoubtedly rises to the
level of persecution.”194 By recognizing Ms. Mohammed’s possible social
group membership as one of “Somalian females” or “young girls in the
Bendari clan,” the court implicitly defined her group by common past
experience. In defining these two groups, the court noted that “genital
mutilation is not clan-specific, but rather is deeply imbedded in the culture
throughout the nation and performed on approximately 98 percent of females,”

191

Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1073.
Donovan, supra note 52, at 325 (quoting In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, at 3).
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thereby constructing those two groups on the basis of the common past
experience of FGM.195
Both sex trafficking and domestic violence-based asylum claims have
encountered resistance from courts on the basis that circular reasoning
precludes recognition of that particular social group. In other words, courts
have reasoned that a group cannot be defined by the fact that it suffers
persecution.196 This rationale is flawed because the unifying past experience of
persecution is only one factor in defining that social group; the persecution was
inflicted in the first place because of the immutable characteristic of being a
woman, as recognized by the Mohammed court.197 The woman has additional,
unchanging, psychological, and social characteristics as a result of her being a
victim of that persecution.198
In the case of sex trafficking claims, former victims may be considered a
social group based on their common characteristic of having been trafficked.
On account of shared past experience, they could face differing types of
persecution such as ostracism, punishment, reprisals, or re-trafficking.199 Such
reasoning could have been applied to the case of Sophie, introduced above,200
195

Id. at 796.
Knight, supra note 40, at 10.
197
Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 798 (“Moreover, there is little question that genital mutilation
occurs to a particular individual because she is a female.”).
198
In one study of asylum-seekers seeking mental health services, instances of PTSD and
depressive disorders occurred in frequencies of 82 and 96 percent, respectively. Survivors of
trauma experience symptoms such as flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, nightmares, and
dissociation from normal emotional responses. They may also experience memory problems,
which can lead to unintentional omissions of particularly traumatic facts when attempting to
tell their stories in a courtroom setting. Lustig, supra note 95, at 726.
199
Knight, supra note 40, at 4 (referencing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on
International Protection: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at
Risk of Being Trafficked, HCR/GIP/06/07 P39 (Apr. 7, 2006)). See also Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2003) (granting refugee status to a former child
soldier who had “shared past experience of abduction, torture, and escape with other former
child soldiers.”).
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Knight, supra note 40, at 8 (citing Matter of Anon, A# redacted (Seattle, WA Immigration
Court, Feb. 7, 2000) at 5).
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in which the IJ refused to recognize her proposed group: women from her
country, “forced into prostitution by the mafia who escape bondage.”201 Even
though the judge accepted as true all of the facts of her case, including
Sophie’s assertion that “she would either be abducted again and again
subjected to prostitution, . . . or, more likely, be targeted for ritualized
execution,” the IJ failed to see Sophie’s past experience of being trafficked as
an immutably defining characteristic.202
In another rare case, Matter of F-L,203 where asylum was granted to a
Honduran trafficking victim, the court skirted the notion of gender but
implicitly recognized common past experience in its analysis.204 After being
beaten unconscious while at work one day, Laura was held captive in a brothel,
where she was forced to have sex with police officers and soldiers, among
others. When she was finally able to escape to the United States, Laura
appealed her denial of asylum by the IJ on the basis of a social group
composed of gender, plus nationality, age, and inability to escape forced
prostitution.205 Yet, instead of recognizing this group, the BIA constructed its
own, composed of “children who have been abandoned by their parents and
who have not received surrogate protection,” noting that Laura’s “extreme
vulnerability” was a critical characteristic.206 Though this reasoning is blatantly
problematic because it completely excludes gender from the social group
construction, it does recognize the vulnerability of victims such as Laura by
virtue of their common experience of being trafficked. This case law thus
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Id. at 9.
Id. (Notably, the IJ relied on the then-recent opinion in Matter of R-A, finding that
Sophie’s proposed social group “failed to pass muster under the Board’s analysis under
Matter of R-A.”).
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Knight, supra note 40 n.146 (citing Matter of Anon, A# redacted (Anchorage, AK,
Immigration Court, Jul. 24, 1998)).
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Id. at 14.
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supports non-consensual, common past experiences as valid social group
characteristics.207
Victims of domestic violence similarly share a past experience of
persecution coupled with gender identity. In Matter of R-A, Rodi Alvarado’s
experience of mental and physical abuse at the hands of her husband was
unique—and immutable—to her position as a woman in Guatemalan society.
Yet, the court held that the Acosta immutability test was “merely a necessary
but not sufficient condition to the construction of that group.”208 Instead, it
found that Ms. Alvarado had failed to show a “voluntary associational
relationship” among group members.209 Yet, it is noteworthy that Perdomo v.
Holder recognized the significance of a common past experience of abuse
when it invoked the two-prong test under Hernandez-Montiel.210 This test
permits consideration of “an innate characteristic [,which] is so fundamental to
the identities or consciences that its members either cannot or should not be
required to change it,” as an alternative to the “voluntary associational”
requirement.211 Finding that the BIA had failed to apply this second prong (just
as the BIA had failed to do in the pre-Hernandez-Montiel case, Matter of R-A),
the Perdomo court remanded for determination of whether “Guatemalan
women” could constitute a social group.212 Arguably, the common experience
of being victimized women of that society should constitute sufficient innate
characteristics for this latter prong of analysis.
By emphasizing this theory of circular reasoning, courts alienate refugee
women by characterizing their experiences of persecution as isolated incidents
that have no impact on their social or psychological well being. To recognize
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Id. at 11.
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975.
209
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975 (quoting Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. at
917–18) (BIA 1999).
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Hernandez–Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) followed the BIA’s holding in
Matter of R-A.
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common past experience as an immutable factor in gender-based claims offers
protection against the intricacies of female subordination.
2. Imputing “Gender” to Other Asylum Grounds
In constructing gender-based asylum claims, courts have often completely
skirted the issue of “social group” by imputing gender issues to other grounds
for asylum, most commonly political opinion and religion.213 This strategy is
problematic because it further clouds judicial understanding of gender issues
by attempting to fit them into rigid, male-oriented categories. Although some
individual women have succeeded on their asylum claims for these separate
grounds, fitting gender claims into categories where they do not belong merely
perpetuates a fundamental problem of immigration courts: their failure to
recognize gender-specific persecution.214
Among FGM claims, courts have construed gender-based claims in ways
that impute political opinion, even if that is not the ground on which asylum is
being sought. Underscoring the language of Kasinga, which in fact recognized
a gender-based claim, is also an implied ground of political opinion.215 The
court considered the fact that Kasinga did “not wish to be subjected to FGM,”
thus implying that it was her belief—and not her identity as a victimized
woman—that was relevant for formulating her claim.216 This mistaken
construction also affects the way that courts construe nexus, because where
they fail to examine the proper gender-based social group, courts cannot
acknowledge persecution “on account of” gender.217 This focus on macro-level
difficulties of an individual’s resistance to oppressive gender practices neglects
213

See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F. 3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993); Matter of R-A, 22. I. & N. Dec. 906
(BIA 1999); Matter of D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77 (BIA 1993); Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 357 (BIA 1996); Matter of S-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999).
214
Randall, supra note 2, at 298.
215
Donovan, supra note 52, at 324 (citing Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA
1996) (recognizing social group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who
have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, performed, and who oppose the practice.”).
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Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (BIA 1996).
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Donovan, supra note 52, at 324.
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gender as the basis of the particular social group. Furthermore, to suggest that
a woman’s belief that she should be free from beatings and violence is a
“political belief” is inappropriate—it implies that a woman’s entitlement to be
treated as a human being is just a particularized opinion, not a fundamental
right.218 That reasoning relegates refugee women to a distant, non-universal
sphere of individual human rights.219
Victims of sex trafficking have likewise employed this tactic of claiming
asylum based on an imputed gender-based political opinion or religious
inference. This conceptual separation—between political opinion and
victimization based on sex trafficking—allowed for an unfavorable result in
the case of Ann, who was denied on both of these grounds.220 Ann had been
approached by her trafficker several times on the street with requests that she
marry him, and at one point he yelled at her mother, making a threat in
reference to her membership in the Democratic Party in Albania.221 Yet, the IJ
did not find a connection between her persecution and any of the Convention
grounds (she had argued on the basis of political opinion and a gender-defined
social group).222 Not only was Ann’s claim dismissed as one of personal,
criminal intent, but it may be inferred that the IJ’s nexus analysis was further
clouded by the political opinion claim—for which there was no clear
connection.223 Thus, the trend of imputing political opinion to claims of
gender-based persecution adds to the confusion of adjudicators in identifying
the underlying motivation for such persecution.
218

Randall, supra note 2, at 298 (“Consider that it would be odd to argue that South African
whites oppressed blacks because blacks held the opinion that they were entitled to be treated
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Similarly, courts impute political opinion and religious beliefs to asylum
claims based on domestic violence, thereby further convoluting theories of
gender-persecution. For example, in Matter of R-A, Ms. Alvarado argued in
part on the basis of imputed political opinion, claiming that her husband was
harming her in order to overcome her resistance to his male domination.224
Yet, the court rejected this argument, stating that there was no evidence that
her husband cared what her political opinions were.225 Thus, by attempting to
adapt the male-oriented ground of political opinion to Ms. Alvarado’s genderspecific manifestation of persecution, the court lost sight of the most
significant, gendered aspects of her claim.226
In another domestic violence-related claim, Matter of S-A,227 the BIA
completely avoided the social group category and granted asylum based on
religion, saying that “the record clearly establishes that because of his orthodox
Muslim beliefs regarding women and his daughter’s refusal to submit to such
religiously-inspired demands, the respondent’s father treated her differently
from her brothers, her male counter parts.”228 In that case, a Moroccan woman
sought asylum due to the extreme and escalating abuse of her father.229 Her
father had burned her legs with a hot razor for wearing a skirt that was too
short, did not let her stay in school past the third grade, and permanently
224

LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 924.
The BIA also had to distinguish Matter of R-A from the previous Ninth Circuit case,
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), which treated the persecutor as seeking
to overcome the applicant’s actual political opinion that men should not be permitted to
dominate women. However, the BIA held that Lazo-Majano only stood for the “proposition
that cynically imputed political opinion can suffice.” LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note
3, at 924.
226
However, imputing a political opinion ground has also been used by courts to grant
asylum claims. For example, in a 2001 case in New York, the court granted asylum based on
a social group of “women in Guatemalan society who resist male domination by living
independently and self-sufficiently.” Matter of Octavia, A# redacted (New York, NY,
Immigration Court, Mar. 10, 2001), 18, 20 (on file with author).
227
22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1336 (BIA 2000).
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confined her to the house after she spoke to a man asking for directions.230 The
court characterized the actions of her father as “ultra orthodox Muslim views”
that conflicted with her “liberal Muslim views.”231 Again, the court chose to
evade constructions of gender persecution in favor of using a gender-neutral
“religion” analysis. In another domestic violence-based case, DHS negated the
applicant’s assertion that she was persecuted based on her “feminist” political
opinion.232 DHS argued that “harm is not on account of political opinion when
it is inflicted regardless of the victim’s opinion rather than because of that
opinion.”233 Imputing gender in this instance would not provide a court with
the proper tools to recognize such a claim.
In all of these situations, courts’ attempts to fit gender issues into preconstructed, male-oriented categories of asylum circumvent the fundamental
problem of raising gender as a surface issue. While courts should factor gender
into their evaluation of existing asylum grounds where appropriate, they
should not go out of their way to misconstrue gender-based issues. Instead,
they should name it for what it is: gender-based persecution. This can only be
done by incorporating cultural context into “social group” constructions so as
to not force courts into this limiting type of analysis.234
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3. Social Visibility
Women seeking asylum based on FGM, sex trafficking, or domestic
violence frequently encounter judicial biases that employ “visibility” criteria
that preclude formation of a social group.235 The BIA’s 2006 decision in
Matter of C-A explicitly set forth this “visibility” criteria in order to establish a
cognizable social group, even though such criteria contravenes UNHCR’s
guidance.236 Requiring “visibility” in order to define a persecuted group seems
counter-intuitive because, in all likelihood, that very persecution has caused
the group to be socially invisible. To require politically voiceless and
disenfranchised groups to show recognition by the same forces that may be
subjecting them to persecution is impractical. This is especially true in the
realm of gender-based persecution, as women are often relegated to the private
sphere of the home, where their suffering cannot be viewed by society at
large.237 Placing emphasis on “visibility” as a factor alienates refugee women
because to do so presumes that they have a role in the public sphere, although
in many cultures, this often remains a strictly male-accessible arena.
Numerous examples illustrate the implications of this flawed reasoning. For
example, in Matter of A-C, a young Mexican girl was frequently beaten by her
father—such beatings included weekly whippings—because of her attempts to
protect her mother.238 Though the IJ found a viable social group of “Mexican
children subjected to domestic violence,” the BIA reversed, stating that she
had not shown that the group was recognized and determined to be a societal
235

See, e.g., Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Matter of S-E-G,
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Cir. 2009); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (calling into question the
appropriateness of the social visibility test).
238
Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1536.

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Refugee Women as Cultural Others

faction in Mexico.239 The court in Matter of R-A employed similar reasoning
when it distinguished Ms. Alvarado’s case from FGM in the following ways:
(1) the evidence did not show that “domestic violence is . . . [a] socially
important practice,” (2) failure to commit or suffer domestic violence “does
not cause social ostracism—non-abusive husbands and non-abused wives are
not socially ostracized because they are not abusive or abused,” and (3) Rodi
Alvarado did not show that “domestic violence was so pervasive that
Guatemalan society targets women who have not been abused.”240
The fact that the court distinguished these “visibility” factors from an FGM
claim, where presumably such visibility does exist, demonstrates the way that
courts have placed undue emphasis on social consciousness of a given group.
Matter of Kasinga emphasized a public display of resistance to the practice of
FGM and downplayed Kasinga’s identity as a woman. By formulating the
claim in this male-oriented way, that court created a model of social visibility
for future courts to follow, allowing them to ignore the essence of Kasinga’s
actual claim to persecution as a woman. Thus, in Matter of R-A, the court
failed to see that the lack of social visibility is in fact a symptom of deeply
pervasive persecution—and that unlike FGM, punishment for non-compliance
with the “practice” of domestic violence was one and the same. In another
case, DHS argued that based upon the principles of social visibility, a domestic
violence victim and asylum applicant had failed to establish that “there exists
in Mexican society a sufficient consensus as to what constitutes an ‘abusive’
domestic relationship, a term which is subjective and thus amorphous.”241
As in the cases of victims of FGM and domestic violence, factors that would
distinguish women as targets for sex trafficking are connected to their
vulnerability—and, therefore, lack of visibility in certain social settings.
Examples of “invisible” social subsets that are likely to be targeted for sex
239
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trafficking include “single women, widows, divorced women, illiterate women,
separated or unaccompanied children, orphans, or street children.”242 Thus,
using the visibility requirement from Matter of Kasinga and Matter of R-A,
courts could easily misconstrue “social group” to preclude such
disenfranchised populations from forming a claim.243 For example, a court
could reason that illiterate women would not be ostracized or abused because
they oppose sex trafficking. Yet, this reasoning does not account for the reality
that women are not exploited for sex trafficking because they oppose it, but
rather because of their disadvantaged and unseen social status as women.
Furthermore, where visibility is attached as a requirement, societal
misconstructions about the role of consent in cases of forced prostitution or
trafficking are likely to be given undue weight. Though it can hardly be argued
that women of disadvantaged social status would have chosen a life of
prostitution for themselves, it is possible that such assumptions can easily
infiltrate considerations of sex trafficking claims.244
By eradicating a requirement for “social visibility” from social group, courts
will be better able to identify persecution on the basis of gender, which is often
hidden from the public eye. Moreover, it will place the United States in
alliance with international human rights instruments.245 This strategy will
avoid alienation of refugee women because it does not downplay their roles in
the private sphere, but rather acknowledges that persecution manifests itself
ways that are often invisible to the public eye.
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Knight, supra note 40, at 4.
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D. Formulations of Nexus
Asylum law’s construction of “nexus” fails to see individual instances of
persecution as stemming from a deep-seated societal persecution on the basis
of gender. Such judicial reasoning is—perhaps most importantly—related to an
understanding of how fundamental principles of refugee law should be applied
to the public and private sphere.
1. Cultural Meaning of the Private Sphere
Aligned with international human rights principles, US asylum law
considers that a state must be held to an affirmative duty to eradicate social and
economic structures that perpetuate female subordination.246 In other words,
“where a state fails to take affirmative steps to protect battered women from
intra-familial violence and other forms of gender-based violence, it is complicit
in creating the harm.”247 States that are “unable or unwilling” to offer
protection for a particular group are seen as perpetuating such persecution on
account of that particular group membership.248 Despite recognition of this
principle, US courts have implicitly—and perhaps at times unconsciously—
created improper dividing lines between the public and private spheres. This
division relegates refugee women to the latter and precludes them from
soliciting their state’s duty to offer them protection against systemic, cultural
female subordination.
When constructing gender-based asylum claims, courts have repeatedly
condemned the actions of the persecutor, but limited that condemnation to the
particularity of the individual situation. For example, in Matter of A-T, the
court flippantly dismissed Ms. A-T’s claim of forced marriage to her first
cousin by recasting it as an “arranged marriage” and her fear as a “mere
reluctance to uphold family tradition” over “personal preference.”249 In another
246
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sex trafficking case, Matter of H-H, the court denied asylum, explaining that
the kidnappers, “did not target her for any purpose other than for their own
criminal enrichment.”250 Furthermore, the IJ explained that Ms. H-H had been
“randomly targeted” by men she had never seen before “for no other reason
than her location at that particular moment, her gender, and her age, not
because the kidnappers bore any personal animus against her on account of one
of the Act’s enumerated grounds.”251 Though this reasoning in fact
acknowledges that she was targeted in part on account of her gender, it refuses
to place a duty on the state to protect women who may be systematically
sought out for sex trafficking because of their societal position in the private
sphere.
Courts especially relegate issues of domestic violence to private spheres,
implicitly conceding that such locations are beyond the scope of legal redress.
In Matter of D-K, for example, the BIA found that a domestic violence
survivor’s claim was not viable because she was not persecuted on account of
group membership, but merely because her husband was a “despicable
person.”252 In that case, Ms. Kuna had been beaten, raped, and sustained
serious injuries during her lengthy marriage to one of President Mobutu’s
military officers in the former Zaire.253 Even after recognizing the state’s lack
of protection for survivors of domestic violence, as well as a gender-based
social group, the IJ denied asylum.254 Notably, the BIA in Matter of D-K
applied the reasoning of Matter of R-A in its analysis, concluding that the
persecution could not be linked to either Ms. D-K’s political opinions or to any
social group. In both cases, the “social visibility” requirement for the social
group analysis affects the reasoning for nexus because it requires that the
motivation for the persecution be evident in the public sphere. In Matter of R250
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A, the BIA determined that Ms. Alvarado’s claim failed because “she has not
shown that women are expected by society to be abused, or that there are any
adverse societal consequences to women or their husbands if the women are
not abused.”255 Thus, the court not only required that the group be defined in a
socially visible manner, but also that the motivation of the persecutor be
derived from public pressure. Such reasoning fails to consider the inherent
nature of intimate violence as far removed from the public eye.256
To a certain extent, this failure by US courts to recognize the duty of a state
as extending to the private sphere stems from imbedded biases regarding
cultural differences. Indeed, it has been recognized that “the case of genderbased persecution appears to go more smoothly when the cultural context can
be ‘anthropologized’—that is, presented as non-Western, inferior, and usually
barbaric towards women.”257 The refugee system possesses an ingrained notion
that “we” of the receiving country have dealt with problems of gender
violence, and that “they” are very different from us in that regard.258 This
presumption is ill-founded, especially in light of the United States’ failure to
protect victims of domestic violence,259 and it leads to the conclusion that
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refugee law should assume that most states are not able to protect women from
“private” violence.260
Based on the above considerations, courts should give wider deference to
circumstantial evidence when considering gender-based claims in order to
minimize the manifestation of imbedded cultural biases. This would include a
consideration of patterns of violence “that are (1) supported by the legal
system or social norms in the country and (2) reflect a prevalent belief within
society, or within relevant segments of society, that cannot be deduced by
evidence of random acts within that society.”261 Furthermore, the sources of
this information should be scrutinized for accuracy, as country conditions often
ignore gender issues or have little gender relevance.262 While country of origin
information may establish that a certain country has adequate legislation in
place, it rarely provides sufficient detail on whether the legislation is
implemented or not and is formulated with regard to the adult male
experience.263 Domestic violence survivors, for example, frequently lack
corroborating evidence of abuse because police in their home countries simply
will not respond to their pleas for help.264
By giving greater weight to circumstantial evidence—and ensuring the
accuracy of that information—courts can better address the persecution of
refugee women relegated to the private sphere. Giving greater weight to
260
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considerations of cultural context will help offset any imbedded biases that
would construct refugee women as Others meriting different outcomes.
2. Bifurcated Approach
In addressing the problem of finding a causal relationship between a genderbased ground for persecution and the motivation behind that persecution,
international tribunals and asylum law scholars have advocated for a bifurcated
approach to the nexus analysis.265 This provides that the causal link may be
satisfied: (1) where there is a real risk of being persecuted at the hands of a
non-state actor for reasons related to one of the Convention grounds, whether
or not the failure of the state to protect the claimant is Convention-related; or
(2) where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor is
unrelated to a Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the
State to offer protection is for a Convention reason.266 Although courts in
countries such as England, New Zealand, Australia, and even the United States
have adopted this approach to find a viable nexus for gender-based claims, the
bifurcated analysis should still be supplemented by culturally sensitive
constructions of the private sphere with less emphasis on the persecutor’s
intent.
In Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,267 a domestic
violence-based claim in England, the Lords’ majority found that the claimant
had been unable to prove nexus for the first prong of the analysis (being
persecuted by a non-state actor on the basis of one of the Convention grounds),
but that the second prong (the inability of the state to protect) was satisfied.268
The court concluded that the “serious harm” of spousal violence was a
“personal affair, directed against the applicants as individuals” and therefore
not causally related to their gender-defined social group status.269 Yet, the
265
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court also noted that the persecution was the result of separate and combined
efforts of the husband’s violence and the failure of state protection. This latter
recognition allowed the court to conclude that although the husband’s actions
were not linked to gender, the state’s failure to protect was—and on this basis,
a nexus to the particular social group could be established.270 The bifurcated
approach thus allows courts that fail to see the link between the individual
persecutor and social group to nonetheless find a nexus based on recognition of
the state’s obligation to protect victimized women.271
In employing this formulaic approach, courts still run the risk of ignoring
cultural context in determining the reasons for which a woman is being
persecuted, either by an individual aggressor or through the negligence of the
state. For example, in Islam, it is unclear what evidence the Lords had before
them regarding the dynamic of domestic violence and its clear gender
component.272 If the record had reflected a current, more comprehensive
understanding of domestic violence, it is possible that it would have found a
Convention reason “inherent in both elements of the persecution,” and thus
both prongs of the bifurcated analysis.273
Applying this reasoning to a hypothetical case of sex trafficking, it would
seemingly be possible for a court to find that a viable asylum claim fails both
prongs of the bifurcated analysis if cultural and societal context is not
considered. For example, if an Albanian woman seeks asylum based on her
membership in the social group “young Albanian woman forced at the threat of
death to become sex slaves,” a court may likely—as they have done frequently
in sex trafficking cases274—find that she suffers from mere individualized
persecution. After failing to find nexus in the first prong of the analysis, the
270
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court could likewise find that the state did not have a duty to protect members
of that particular group because there were safe places within the country for
such victims. Indeed, one court facing a similar case found that since Albania
is “in flux and is being modernized,” the applicant could easily avoid being
trafficked by relocating to another region of Albania.275 This reasoning
assumes that the state has provided safe pockets within the country for victims
of sex trafficking and ignores the reality that trafficking is an international
phenomenon, facilitated by secret and complex networks of traffickers. It also
does not recognize that in some countries women may experience severe
discrimination and social ostracism because they were raped. In fact, DHS has
noted that this treatment alone may amount to persecution, and UNHCR also
recognizes that such victims may experience punishment by their family and/or
the local community.276 Thus, failure to consider the specific social dangers
faced by victims of trafficking when applying the bifurcated approach would
create anomalous results.277
As demonstrated in these case examples, without consideration of the social
reactions and cultural significance of having been sex-trafficked and
domestically abused, a court could fail to find nexus by using the bifurcated
analysis. Thus, while the bifurcated analysis is a helpful step towards proper
judicial construction of nexus for gender-based claims, its success can only be
guaranteed with greater emphasis on the role of culture and the nuances of a
specific society.278
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3. Intent of the Persecutor
To establish nexus, courts must essentially look at the motivation of the
persecutor—a subjective yet crucial determination for any asylum claim.
Courts, such as the one in Matter of R-A, have explicitly rejected the bifurcated
approach in favor of an inquiry into the motives of the entity actually inflicting
the harm.279 This approach is flawed for two primary reasons. First, it places
the entire focus of the nexus analysis on the relationship between the private
actor and the victim.280 In doing so, it clouds one of the central purposes of
refugee law—to provide protection where the state has failed to do so. Second,
a focus on the intent of the persecutor opens the door for relativist judgments
on the social norms and practices of other cultures. Again, this is problematic
because it contravenes a fundamental premise of refugee law—the existence of
universal human rights.
In Matter of Kasinga, the court implied that a punitive or malignant intent
was required by the perpetrator; such an intent was nonexistent in that case.
Given that the actual perpetrators of violence were the midwives or elders who
performed FGM, these actors had no intent to punish the victim and
presumably believed that they were performing an important cultural rite.
However, the court resolved the case by finding that the societal objectives
achieved by FGM—gender subordination and an attempt to control female
sexuality—were not harmless.281 Although the Kasinga court reached a
positive result for the applicant, it achieved this through a convoluted,
roundabout analysis that initially emphasized the relationship of the private
actor to the victim as well as the persecutor’s intent. The latter consideration—
intent—introduces undertones of cultural relativism into the analysis because it
assumes that the persecutor may have a unique cultural perspective that would
justify the act.
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Other courts facing different gender-based claims have followed suit in their
analysis of intent. Specifically, in many cases of sex trafficking, courts deny
claims because they construct the persecutor’s motive as economic as opposed
to a Convention ground for asylum.282 Such a construction ignores the fact that
women are economically disadvantaged because they are women, and
therefore that merely considering a persecutor’s facially apparent intent fails to
address the complexities of women’s social reality. For example, in the case of
one sex trafficking victim, the court considered that there was no evidence that
the “kidnappers bore any personal animus against her on one of the Act’s
enumerated grounds.”283 Also, a domestic violence case, Matter of S-A,
resulted in a grant of asylum after the court considered, with regards to an
abusive father, that “the record clearly establishes that because of his orthodox
Muslim beliefs regarding women and his daughter’s refusal to submit . . . the
respondent’s father treated her different from . . . her male counter-parts
[sic].”284
Placing focus on the intent of the persecutor in gender-based asylum claims
is counterproductive to the basic goals of refugee law. It introduces
subjectivity into a realm of law that is premised on recognition of objective,
universal human rights. To avoid anomalous results, courts should not consider
the intent of the persecutor but should instead engage in a bifurcated analysis
that properly considers cultural context.
E. Procedural Safeguards
This article proposes several jurisprudential constructions for gender-based
asylum claims that consider the cultural and social sensitivities affecting
refugee women and that would better facilitate refugee women’s ability to
obtain asylum. However, in order for these formulations to be properly
282
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implemented, the procedures for bringing forth these claims must likewise
provide a manner for all of the relevant information and evidence to be heard.
The substance of a gender-based claim contains extremely sensitive material
that a refugee woman may be reluctant to fully disclose under any
circumstances, much less within the context of an intimidating legal situation.
This section gives a brief overview of various considerations regarding
training, interviewing, and the overall court process that are necessary to
ensure that a female asylum-seeker is given sufficient procedural protections.
The asylum interview can be an extremely intimidating experience, but it is
of utmost importance for the applicant to tell the truth and establish
credibility.285 For example, because refugee women may face a male
interviewer or interpreter, these circumstances are often not conducive to
bringing forth gender-related claims.286 In such a situation, a woman may not
be able to convey her whole story due to a reluctance to speak freely and give a
full account of the violence she has experienced. Specifically, female
applicants may fail to respond to questions concerning the type of harm they
fear, such as sexual abuse.287 Interviewers also may not understand that a lack
of displayed emotion does not necessarily imply that the woman is not deeply
affected by the harm she has suffered. The interviewer must consider that
cultural differences and trauma play important, complex roles in determining
behavior.288
One solution to this problem would be to guarantee that interviewers and
interpreters dealing with female asylum-seekers are women.289 This would
allow for a more comfortable and safe environment for story sharing, and
would ultimately lead to better-developed cases. Additionally, both openended and specific questions that may help to reveal gender issues should be
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used in asylum interviews. For example, women who have been indirectly
involved in political activity or to whom political opinions have been attributed
often do not provide relevant information in their interviews due to the maleoriented nature of the questioning.290
Another recurring problem is that officials involved in the asylum procedure
often lack adequate training on gender issues and thus fail to ask the right
questions or analyze the evidence before them properly.291 This lack of
understanding necessitates adequate and ongoing training for immigration and
refugee decision makers.292 Especially in light of the arbitrariness and variance
in asylum grants depending on the gender of the adjudicator, proper education
regarding sensitivity towards gender-based claims is essential.293 Also,
requiring that national asylum precedents concerning gender-based violence be
published would help to raise awareness and ensure greater quality and
consistency within the US system.294
Ultimately, revising current jurisprudence with gender-sensitive
formulations of “social group” and “nexus” is only a first step. In order to
effectuate the goals implicit in such a revision, comprehensive reform of the
asylum process and its procedures is necessary to sufficiently protect refugee
women.
F. Opening the Floodgates
It is an early morning at the detention center, and I have accompanied one
of my colleagues, an immigration attorney, to give a workshop to a group of
Central American women detainees applying for asylum in the United
290
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States.295 After leading us through a maze of locked doors and rather ominous
corridors, the guard signals the end of our journey. We will conduct our
presentation (in Spanish) in the middle of the large, open space at the center of
an unoccupied unit of individual cells. The group of women—clad in yellow
jumpsuit prison garb—files into the room. After a few moments of shuffling
chairs, my colleague launches into an explanation of the asylum process and
allows for a never-ending stream of questions from the women. Somehow, a
group of nearly thirty Central American women have recently ended up
detained here, and almost all of them seek asylum based on domestic or gang
violence in their home countries.
As the workshop discussion continues, the insurmountable challenges faced
by these women become all the more apparent. For one, none of them speak
English and everything submitted to the court must be translated from Spanish
to English. One woman explains that she has newspaper articles to include
with her application, and several others express concerns about translating
their declarations. Apparently, there is a female detainee (not present) who
happens to speak English. She has been helping the women write and translate
their declarations, but she is too afraid to certify the translations with her
signature (as required by the court) for fear of adverse consequences. Other
women explain that they do not have any evidence to corroborate their
declarations: no police records, medical records, news reports. All of these
challenges are exacerbated by the fact that these women must remain detained,
constantly working under the shadow of mistrust and fear of the detention
center staff. None of them have attorneys, and our over-burdened staff (of four
attorneys, with nearly 1,500 detainees to serve) has little time and resources to
dedicate to their specific cases.
Having entered in a state of fear and post-traumatic stress, they had been
required to disclose the details of their persecution to an immigration officer,
295
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who makes preliminary determinations about the credibility of their fear. Most
of the women remain detained while fighting their cases. They do not have the
language skills or knowledge to tell their stories to the court. And they have no
one to advocate for them.
The increased recognition of gender-based asylum claims advocated by this
article spurs controversy among critics. More specifically, many argue that a
fair interpretation of the Refugee Convention, or domestic refugee law of the
United States, does not encompass such claims.296 At the core of such criticism
is the concern that liberalizing standards for gender-based claims will “open
the floodgates” to a group of female asylum-seekers too large for the United
States to practically accommodate.297 As the narrative above exemplifies,
refugee women face significant procedural barriers in even making their cases
heard—perhaps a task even more daunting than surpassing the additional
hurdles of unsympathetic legal frameworks. The fear that floods of refugee
women will suddenly be granted asylum is therefore unfounded.
Although US asylum jurisprudence has explicitly recognized that the innate
characteristics defining a particular social group may be diverse, courts have
repeatedly denied asylum to women with gender-based claims for reasons of
broadness.298 In such cases, courts often base their reasoning on the SanchezTrujillo opinion, which stated that a group could not be defined by a “sweeping
demographic division” where its members “naturally manifest diverse cultures,
and contrary political leanings.”299 For example, in the case of a sex trafficking
claim, the IJ ruled that “to accept respondent’s argument would mean that all
young women in Albania who believe they have been similarly harassed would
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merit asylum, clearly this is not the intent of Congress.”300 In another case, a
federal court rejected the applicant’s claim in part because “then virtually any
young Albanian woman who possesses the subjective criterion of being
‘attractive’ would be eligible for asylum in the United States.”301
The concern that recognition of gender-based asylum claims will open US
borders to all refugee women is also contrary to basic principles of refugee
law. To recognize large social groups situated in structured relationships of
inequality (no social group being larger than gender) is “antithetical to the
liberal political tradition that sees the individual as the fundamental unit of
analysis.”302 However, the assumption that asylum law functions to provide
categorical relief simply based on group membership is completely
erroneous.303 In fact, it misses the fundamental goal of this area of refugee law,
which provides for a case-by-case analysis. Though there may be vast numbers
of people in the world who suffer oppression and persecution, each individual
claimant must make her case—after surpassing whatever hurdles are necessary
to even enter US borders.304 Each applicant must then fit her asylum petition
into a rigid legal framework, often without the assistance of legal counsel. In
theory, asylum law provides a “micro-level solution” on a case-by-case basis
to the “macro-level social, economic, and political problems of the world.”305
The holistic approach proposed in this article will not result in the granting
of all gender-based claims. Refugee women must still gather evidence and
substantiate all of the requirements for an asylum application. For example, in
the instance of a potential domestic violence claim, harm by a husband may
not be sufficiently serious to meet the definition of persecution. In other
claims, there may not be a particularized failure of state protection.306 Even
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with comprehensive reforms to accommodate gender-based claims, refugee
women still face many challenges in making their cases that will prevent an
influx of asylum-seekers.307 The most basic of these challenges, of course, is
their ability to escape their situation in their country of origin at all.308
Also, it should be noted that Canada, which began offering protection to
battered women seeking asylum in 1993, has not yet experienced an upsurge in
new asylum claims. In the first two years after Canada adopted its guidelines
recognizing gender-based persecution as a ground for asylum, “approximately
195 gender-related claims for asylum were granted—about two percent of all
Canadian asylum claims filed since the guidelines went into effect.”309
Similarly, the United States has seen no significant increase in FGM-related
claims since the Matter of Kasinga decision in 1996, nor since the DHS brief
in Matter of R-A was filed advocating for recognition of domestic violencebased claims.310
In addition to these considerations, the excuse that recognition of genderbased asylum claims will “open the floodgates” to deny asylum claims is
contrary to the principles of refugee law. Not only do such principles
emphasize offering protection in individual cases for asylum-seekers, but they
underscore the ethical need to provide sanctuary to the world’s victimized
migrants. The stories from Africa and Central America chronicled in this
article are mere vignettes in a larger portrait of global challenges faced by
307
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refugee women. Ultimately, the law should be shaped by the humanity of
refugee women’s struggles.

VI. CONCLUSION
Asylum law is a vehicle through which the United States may define its
understanding of fundamental human rights. Perhaps for this reason, asylum is
an extremely convoluted and nuanced realm through which officials, judges,
and advocates struggle to incorporate a uniform understanding of these rights
into a rigid legal framework. Refugee women are often cast by the wayside in
the course of this struggle. In a historically male-dominated world and with a
male-oriented understanding of human rights, these most vulnerable victims
cannot make their suffering known unless steps are taken to recognize their
plight. Yet, current formulations of “social group” and “nexus” within US
asylum law portray refugee women as cultural Others who are deserving of
different levels of protection. Both implicitly and explicitly, courts relegate the
struggles of these women to untouchable private spheres or use relativist
reasoning to reach anomalous results for gender-based asylum claims.
Proceeding from a non-relativist understanding of fundamental human
rights, this article has focused on gender-based claims of FGM, sex trafficking,
and domestic violence to illustrate both the universality of these rights as well
as the diversity of gender-based persecution. Despite international recognition
of the need to protect refugee women and the particularized challenges they
face, the United States does not reflect this understanding of refugee law in its
implementation of asylum jurisprudence. In order to eradicate imputed notions
of cultural Otherness and misunderstanding in asylum jurisprudence, courts
must restructure their formulations of “social group” and “nexus” to better suit
the needs of refugee women. “Social group” should be construed to include
common past experience as an immutable characteristic, and courts should not
misconstrue gender-related claims to fit under other Convention grounds,
thereby perpetuating judicial evasion of gender issues. Visibility should not be
weighted for constructions of “social group” in gender-based claims because
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this fails to recognize the societal roles of refugee women in the private sphere.
Furthermore, nexus should be formulated through a bifurcated approach that
includes a deep cultural understanding of the private sphere and does not
emphasize the intent of the persecutor. These constructions allow for
consideration of cultural and social sensitivities that affect gender-based claims
while avoiding relativist undertones of cultural Otherness.
Yet, these jurisprudential modifications can only be effectuated with proper
procedural modifications that likewise recognize the plight of refugee women.
Providing gender-sensitive safeguards through the interview process and
offering training for asylum officials are both reasonable solutions to
procedural challenges. Finally, widespread criticism that recognition of
gender-based claims will open the floodgates to an influx of female asylumseekers is not only unfounded, but it contravenes fundamental principles of
refugee law that emphasize individualized protections for victims of
persecution.
As a part of an increasingly globalized society—and especially as a nation
of immigrants—the United States has a special obligation to uphold
fundamental concepts of human rights. Refugee women constitute one of the
world’s most vulnerable populations because they can so easily become
socially invisible through oppressive societal norms. It is therefore all the more
important that asylum law—which has the purpose of protecting such
victims—does not further relegate women by creating conceptual hurdles in
rigid legal frameworks. Instead of constructing box-like analytical
formulations that treat refugee women as vastly different cultural products, US
asylum law must better translate the universality of human rights into more
fluid formulations embracing cultural differences.
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